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4 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis apposes, illustrates and investigates the fiscal policy and the external schemes of 
EU’s budgetary revenues and expenditures.  
 
After a general analysis of fiscal policy in the first chapter the thesis continues with the 
external corrective mechanisms, like the European Court of Auditors, as well as others 
corrective mechanisms of European Commission. Therefore, a comparison is made in order to 
understand better their common aspects and their differences. 
 
Lastly, the last chapter highlights the aspects of the Greek Audit Court and its cooperation 
with the ECA, giving this way the opportunity to the reader to have a global view of audit 
schemes not only in Europe but also in Greece. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Definition of fiscal policy and short historical reference 
 
Fiscal policy is a key tool that government uses in order to influence its economy. Fiscal 
policy is divided into two key tools for every government. The first one is taxation which 
brings revenues into the government budget. Equally, the second one is government spending 
which presents the expenses of government’s budget. 
In 1960 fiscal policy was much more different than today. Apparently, nowadays fiscal policy 
has lost its relevance both in short term and also in long term. Analyzing the first case, fiscal 
policy in short terms was a tool to stabilize, in some way, the business cycle. Nonetheless, 
monetary policy appears to be the one that gained the lost relevance from fiscal policy. Since 
there is a need to elaborate more on this issue, we might explain the two major reasons for the 
downgrading of fiscal policy through the years. Firstly, the huge gap that left behind from 
public deficits and the enormous levels of public debts. Those debts were created by the 
increase on government and public spending, the cuts in taxation and from a strict monetary 
policy followed by immense and huge interest rates. Secondly, despite the predominant theory 
of Keynesian economic policies that was ruling in the nineteen-sixties, neoclassical theories 
signalized that imbalances on fiscal sector and the large amount of public revenues and 
expenditures would have a negative impact on short and long term. 
Consequently, the rules and the institutional framework of fiscal policy in European Union 
follow the theoretical basis mentioned above. Fiscal imbalances have been reduced in national 
fiscal policies due to the rules imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) stabilize the fiscal discipline due to the fear of relaxation. With the SGP the 
deviations of fiscal policy have been lowered and this made to a large extent fiscal policy 
subordinated to the monetary one. The violations of fiscal rules led to a reformation of SGP in 
2005 giving at national fiscal policies more flexibility. However, there are many criticisms for 
the current fiscal framework in Europe due to the lack of federal budget and due to the 
absence of national fiscal policies. 
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External audit institution of European Union and the audit control in Greece 
 
European Court of Auditors is an audit institution and more specifically the independent 
external audit institution of European Union. ECA is located at Luxembourg. Its purpose is to 
beware of interests from European taxpayers. Also, the audit of revenues and expenditure of 
EU is of major priority. Various annual reports are drafted for Court of Auditors to European 
Commission and specify any suspected fraud, corruption or any other illegal facility. Reports 
are also sent to European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) for further investigation. Summarizing, 
ECA is crucial European institution whose responsibility is to check any moment EU’s funds 
and to improve EU’s financial management. 
The audit control in Greece took place under the authority of Greek Court of Audit which is 
one of the three biggest Bodies of Greek Public Administration. Furthermore it is not only an 
administrative organ but also the Supreme Administrative Court with a special jurisdiction. 
Finally, its main responsibilities are the advice competence, the jurisdictional competence and 
lastly the auditing competence. 
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CHAPTER I 
Definition of fiscal policy focusing on its managerial effect with 
regard to public finances 
 
‘’When a business or an individual spends more than it makes, it goes bankrupt. When government 
does it, it sends you the bill. And when government does it for 40 years, the bill comes in two ways: 
higher taxes and inflation. Make no mistake about it, inflation is a tax and not by accident’’ 
-Ronald Reagan (1993). “Actor, Ideologue, Politician: The Public Speeches of Ronald Reagan”, 
Greenwood Publishing Group 
 
Introduction 
Fiscal policy along with the monetary policy are two of the most common, widely known and 
recognized tools of every nation’s economic activity through the years. Fiscal policy 
particularly, could be characterized as a corporate term for any government activity like 
expenditure, borrowing and taxation. Any impact in nation’s economy could be interpreted as 
a good interaction of government’s revenue and expenditure which require good timing and 
surely a lot of luck. 
 
1   Historical background of fiscal policy based on Keynes’s theory 
Giving a great historical example of fiscal policy evolution, we could present the Keynesian 
analysis dealing with the concept of aggregate demand. This fact made the comprehension of 
fiscal policy easier. Keynes’s analysis facilitates also the understanding of how income tax 
system supplies the economy of any government with automatic stabilizers. The development 
of many economic theories by the British author during the Great Depression changed the 
way that fiscal policy was exercised until the early twentieth century. Most of the economists 
and government advisers until that time favored budget balances and budget surpluses. The 
revolution of demand driven macroeconomics gave in the governments the convenience along 
with the facility to spend more than they brought in. From now on, governments could borrow 
money and increase spending as a part of a targeted fiscal policy. 
But what exactly is Keynesian economics; In fact, we could say that it is an economic theory 
of total spending in the economy and its effects on output and economy (1). 
 
1 ) ‘Keynesian Economics’, INVESTOPEDIA,         
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/k/keynesianeconomics.asp > 
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By that theory, the stimulation of the demand is of high priority and pushes government to 
increase expenditures and to lower taxes. In his book “The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money”, which was written during the time of great recession, many of the 
economic phenomena couldn’t be explained by classical economic theory. 
Keynes was not keen and positive with the idea of a state of equilibrium in the economy. In 
contrast, he insisted a countercyclical fiscal policy where in expansion period government 
may increase taxes and cut spending and in economic disaster may proceed to deficit 
spending.  
However, the “injection” may lead to an added business activity. Furthermore, the generation 
of more income will make consumers more eager to spend more money, resulting to a growth 
in the gross domestic product (GDP) which could be greater than the initial stimulus account. 
This multiplier effect is based in the simple concept of the increase in consumer’s spending 
power resulting to a cycle of money all over the individuals. 
In conclusion, Keynesian economics is based in the demand-side solutions during 
recessionary periods while an intervention of government is always crucial for the decrease of 
unemployment and low economic demand. 
 
 
2   Mechanisms of fiscal policy 
2.1   Main types of fiscal policy                                                                                                                                    
When we stimulate or constrain fiscal policy, there is always a proper characterization for 
each occasion.  
Consequently, stimulating policy is used in periods of a big slump where state’s expenditures 
are increased, taxes are reduced while usually in a short term period business cycle is being 
softened. In a long term period, on the other hand, a big economic growth is stimulated. 
The constraining period in fiscal policy is characterized by a reduction in expenditures of any 
state, an increase in taxes or a combination of those two along with other measures. While the 
cumulated demand on a short term period of a constraining policy is reduced, on the other 
hand, in a long term period productivity is affected and there is also an increase in the 
unemployment (2). 
 
 
 
2)Nassir Salim, “The impact of Fiscal Policy on Particular Economic Sectors in Turkey and Libya’’, 
Dissertation Thesis, Czech University of Life Sciences, Prague, 2012   
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Example of budgetary deficiencies and surpluses through full employment 
budget 
During the analysis of State’s budget we could analyze the results of a sound fiscal policy. By 
using full employment budget in our example given below, we could investigate the impact of 
an economy in a state’s budget and whether it may be in deficiency or in surplus.  
More analytically, in figure 1 there is a budget’s balance point (E) at a volume of a 
hypothetical release (Qe). Mark (Q1) in our figure is the actual volume of output and the mark 
(Q2) is a new potential at full employment. Marks (K) and (L) depict budgetary deficiency of 
Q1 output. 
However, we understand that the full employment budget has a surplus (M). The lines of 
state’s expenditure and of taxes remain on the same place. So, there were no further 
stimulating measures. The conclusion is that the deficiency occurs from the slump in 
production. 
Figure 1: Budgetary deficiencies, surpluses and the full employment budget 
Source: Nassir Salim, “The impact of Fiscal Policy on Particular Economic Sectors in Turkey 
and Libya’’ 
 
Further fiscal measures should be taken when the production of the state is below average like 
for example a stimulation of cumulative demand. A costly fiscal policy can affect the way that 
cumulate demand operates. Reduction or expansion on cumulate demand corresponds to a 
constraining or to a stimulating fiscal policy respectively, which implies from the factor of the 
increase in the surplus of the budget of the full employment. 
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2.2   Discretionary and automatic fiscal policy 
Any adjustment on government’s economic situation depends on discretionary and automatic 
fiscal policy. 
2.2.1   Expansionary discretionary fiscal policy  
In discretionary fiscal policy the government changes the taxes and the levels of government 
spending (3).The first type of discretionary policy is expansionary fiscal policy. Analyzing 
expansionary policy we could say in a few words that government increases expenditure and 
decreases taxes, resulting in jobs creation. By cutting taxes it gives a boost by putting more 
money into the economic cycle and giving the chance to customers to spend more. However 
expansionary fiscal policy may create a big budget deficit because of government’s 
expenditures are more than its revenues.  
This type of fiscal policy is usually used in a recession period (4). As we said above, an 
increase in aggregate demand leads to a higher economic growth. Apart from that there could 
be a possibility of inflation because of the higher demand in the economy. 
The purpose of expansionary policy is to boost growth in the economy (5). Main advantages of 
this policy could be the lower unemployment and most important, the reinstatement of 
costumers and business confidence for the government because if they don’t trust the 
government’s policies the economy would lead in a depression period. On the other hand, 
main disadvantages are the decrease of government’s revenues and the creation of a budget 
deficit. This unnecessary policy is principally used in election periods from politicians in 
order to get more votes. 
2.2.2   Contractionary discretionary fiscal policy 
Contractionary fiscal policy is when the government raises taxes and cuts expenditure. With 
this kind of economic growth slows. Opportunities for job growth are reduced due 
expenditures’ reduction meaning in less money for the employees. (6)  
 
 
3) Tejvan Pettinger, “Discretionary Fiscal Policy’’, Economics Help, 
<https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/1131/economics/expansionary-discrectionary-fiscal-policy> , 
January 13, 2018                                                                                                                                                          
4) Prateek Agarwal, “Discretionary Fiscal Policy’’, Intelligent Economist,  
<https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/discretionary-fiscal-policy> , June 6, 2018                                 
5) Kimberly Amadeo, “Expansionary Fiscal Policy’’ , The Balance, 
<https://www.thebalance.com/expansionary-fiscal-policy-purpose-examples-how-it-works-3305792 >, 
February 22, 2018                                                                                                                                                       
6) Kimberly Amadeo, “Contractionary Fiscal Policy’’, The Balance, 
<https://www.thebalance.com/contractionary-fiscal-policy-definition-purpose-examples-3305791>, 
March 31, 2018 
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When fiscal policy is contractionary, revenues are higher than expenditures and an example 
for this is when government’s budget is in a surplus. 
The purpose of contractionary policy is to slow growth and to maintain its rate between 2 or 3 
percent a year because inflation could be created if the economy grows more than 3 percent, 
or additionally an increase in prices of investments, or fluctuation with asset bubbles from 
unsustainable high growth that might lead to a recession and finally a decrease of 
unemployment below the natural level of unemployment leading to a smaller growth from the 
production side due to demand for employees.  
Example of  expansionary and contractionary fiscal policies to shift aggregate 
demand 
The figure illustrates the use of fiscal policy to shift aggregate demand regarding recessionary 
and inflationary gap. 
In the first panel, mark (Y1) shows the GDP produced by economy. However it is below its 
potential level of (Yp). Expansionary policy shifts aggregate demand to AD2 trying to close 
the gap. On the other hand, in the second panel economy has an inflationary gap at Y1. The 
reduction of aggregate demand to AD2 is produced by contractionary policy and closes the 
gap. However, effects of fiscal policy on the economy don’t affect interest rates or exchange 
rates (7). 
Figure 2: Expansionary and constractionary fiscal policy to shift aggregate demand 
 
Source: https://courses.lumenlearning.com/macroeconomics/chapter/tax-changes/ 
 
7) University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing, “Principles of Macroeconomic’’, Chapter 12.2, 
<http://open.lib.umn.edu/macroeconomics/chapter/12-2-the-use-of-fiscal-policy-to-stabilize-the-
economy/#rittenmacro-ch12_s02_s02_f01>, 2011 
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2.2.3   Automatic fiscal policy 
 
The second kind of fiscal policy, which is non discretionary, is the automatic fiscal policy. 
The alteration on economic conditions changes automatically government’s taxes and 
expenditures, which decreases inflation and unemployment. Simultaneously there is no need 
for any intentional action. This kind of policy is very important because it stimulates 
aggregate spending during a recession and reduces aggregate spending during an expansion. 
However, there are two main types of automatic stabilizers. The first one is transfer payments 
like unemployment compensation and the second one is personal tax receipt (income). 
Being more specific, during a recession people lose their jobs and those individuals are 
benefited by unemployment advantages. Secondly, the income taxation which is progressive 
tends to fluctuate in different rates while at the same time many of the unemployed people 
pay less tax for their income or they are given a tax refund. Thus, the quick response deters a 
possible fall by providing additional money to households for spending. 
On the other hand, while an economy expands, automatic stabilizers remove expenditures 
from the economy to reduce demand inflationary pressures. As a result, while many 
individuals are employed, government uses their high incomes as an additional tax support. In 
other words, as the economy grows up, leading to full employment, automatic stabilizers 
decrease  a possible inflation (8).  
The significance of stabilizers is summed up for their softening of the impact of a possible 
contraction or expansion. The way that stabilizers ‘’penetrate’’ into the economic cycle and 
their usefulness along with their results makes them a credible way to combat an economic 
imbalance. However, in an appearance of an inflation or recession threat stabilizers can’t face 
them without any deliberate action of the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8) Sanket Suman, “Difference between Discretionary and Automatic Fiscal Policy’’, Economics 
Discussion,< http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/fiscal-policy/difference-between-discretionary-and-
automatic-fiscal-policy/12823> 
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Example and figure of automatic fiscal stabilizers 
According to statements written above, we assume that there is not always need for deliberate 
action of government. 
 
Figure 3: Automatic stabilizers 
 
 
Source: https://slideplayer.com/slide/12862689/ 
In fact, when output tends to increase, tax revenues are about to increase because incomes of 
households along with firm revenues increase. Now it is quite logic that households move up 
to higher tax supports and thus they pay higher rates. Correspondingly, the dependence of 
households right on government’s support decreases and so as government’s expenditure, 
creating this way a budget surplus after a long effort to slow down an overheated 
economy.(Y1).  
Conversely, when output falls, firstly tax revenues fall automatically. Also, at lower incomes 
levels many households pay a lower tax rate than before. When aggregate demand decreases 
there is also an additional decrease in revenues and incomes. Secondly, government’s 
expenditures increases automatically because more and more households receive an extra 
government welfare payment and also more workers receive government unemployment 
benefits (Y2). As a result, the gap between taxes revenues and unemployment compensation 
creates a budget deficit. 
Finally, to put it another way, many of the automatic changes tend to drive the economy 
towards its full employment output level (Yf). 
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CHAPTER II 
Fiscal policy in the preparation of EU budget and the examination of 
its revenues and expenditures 
 
Introduction 
Fiscal rules in EU have been in place for many years. In order to reach the present fiscal 
situation which governs this supranational organization it is necessary to mention that during 
the years there were a couple of efforts in order to reach in a stable and permanent framework. 
As for the European budget, it is notable that there should be many alterations regarding the 
size and the future outlooks if EU wants to evolve into a completed political entity like the 
governance of a federation in the USA.  
 
1   Short historical reference about EU and Treaties that reformed fiscal policy 
in Europe 
European Union is a supranational organization comprising by 28 member-states that are 
located in Europe. There is a common economic, social and security policy among all of its 
members. The ultimate aim of EU is to provide to its citizens a variety of goods and services 
which are for example the free movement of European people, the opportunity of choice 
through a wide range of products from an integrated and internal market. The integration of 
common economic policies, like fiscal and monetary policies, is a major goal in EU. On the 
other hand, policies aiming to the development of trade, agriculture or even regional growth 
and prosperity, could be promoted in order to serve and accomplish the higher standards of 
European integration. 
In 1992 the European Community was renamed as the European Union (EU). The agreement 
was signed in the city of Maastricht (also known as the Treaty of Maastricht) on 7 February 
1992 and created the European Union. Also, with this Treaty euro banknotes and coins of 
European countries replaced all national currencies of the twelve member states in that period. 
Nowadays Euro is the common currency in 19 of 28 member states. 
Stability and Growth Pact is a rule-based coordination of national fiscal policies and its main 
purposes were to create sound fiscal finances. Also the SGP consists of a preventing and a 
deterring arm. The SGP enacted in 1997 and established rules that all member countries must 
maintain a standard rate on annual budget deficit and on national dept.  
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2   The present fiscal framework in EU 
2.1   The Maastricht Treaty 
The issue of a sound fiscal policy has been examined through many Treaties that EU has 
signed. Thus, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 imposed several limits on the member-states 
joining the euro area. More specifically, it foresaw that many fiscal policies would remain in 
the administration of national governments, although limited by compulsory rules (9). 
Five convergence criteria of the Treaty were particularly, firstly the prohibition of inflation 
rates to be more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the average of the three best 
performing members of EU. Also, the exchange rates stability with the participation in 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) for at least two years without severe tensions. Thirdly, 
long term interest rates should not be more than 2% above the rate of the three best 
performing members in terms of price stability. 
Two more criteria about government finance, restrictions to be imposed regarding public 
deficit to no more than 3% of GDP and also the public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. 
Furthermore, it foresaw the prohibition of monetary financing regarding public deficits as 
long as a constitution of an additionally clause of national responsibility for any public dept. 
This was called as “no bail-out” (10). 
However, regarding excessive government borrowing, the concern of liberalization of 
international markets might lead the governments to borrow money in order to finance fiscal 
deficits through foreign borrowing. It is worth of mention that this kind of recommendation 
was not explicitly referred among the convergence criteria. Although, an indirect reference in 
the Treaty was made suggesting implicitly that members with excessive deficits may be 
restricted to borrow from abroad (11). 
Identically, there was a need for a solution to retain a policy instrument with an international 
identity which will supervise the procedure from the creation and maintenance of excessive 
public deficits through limitative rules and at the same time to promote coherence among 
national fiscal policies and monetary policy through coordination mechanisms. 
 
 
 
9) Michael  Bergman, Michael M. Hutchison, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, “Do sound public finances 
require fiscal rules or is market pressure enough?”, European Commission, Economic Paper 489, April 
2013                                                                                                                                                                                
10)  Jesus Ferreiro, Guiseppe Fontana, Felipe Serrano,  “Fiscal policy in the European Union” , 
Palgrave Mackmillan,  2008                                                                                                                                           
11) B .Eichengreen, J. Frieden, J von Hagen,  “Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Integrated Europe”,  
Chapter 6, pages 118-119, Springer Publications 
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2.2   The Stability and Growth Pact (SPG) 
Limits of fiscal policy became permanent with SGP in order to ensure the maintenance of 
fiscal discipline, mainly with two kinds of mechanisms. The first one which was the 
preventive, secured budgetary balance as a medium-term goal and allowed automatic 
stabilizers to handle any crucial economic situation with a small interference when a less 
favorable economic policy occurs. Corrective mechanisms established a stable framework of 
operation regarding excessive deficit process, defining that way the specific sanctions that are 
imposed in any case and exemplifying at the same time any situation of exception. 
Nevertheless, criticism on SGP was unavoidable and many European officials proposed 
numerous suggestions for bigger flexibility in rules and a realization of future aims.  Main 
reasons were that during a case of economic crisis there could be a possibility for 
governments to use counterproductive fiscal policies, the continued periods of economic 
inactivity for member states and finally the time period for this inactivity situation was too 
short. 
 However, all those worries led to a reform of SGP in 2005 which include the following 
features. At first, the deadline for the correction of public deficits was extended. Secondly, 
continued situations of low effective product growth should be assumed as exceptions and 
could be banned with sanctions. Finally, additionally the contribution of many pertinent 
factors may lead to a smoothing of lower public deficit situations (12).  
Notwithstanding those changes gave huge field of choices for governments, making that way 
the Pact more flexible, but on the other hand it became less enforceable due to the 
involvement of various pertinent factors that were referred before (13). 
In sum, the reformed SGP made also more difficult the security of fiscal discipline. 
Obviously, the lack of infliction has remained.  Apparently, during the period of crisis in EU 
there was not a crisis mechanism for the strengthening of EU enforcement. Thus, there are not 
any incentives for member-states to create budget surpluses during prosperous and boom 
periods in order to use them in difficult periods by reducing government dept and leaving 
room for expansionary fiscal policy. 
Analyzing with a small criticism the SGP we could say that it has both pros and cons. At first, 
regarding the benefits a risky government’s fiscal policy may become insolvent and that gives 
one option of a “bail out” from the European Central Bank (ECB) (14). 
 
 
12) Kopits George, Symansky A. Steven, “Fiscal Policy Rules”, IMF , Occasional Paper 162, 1998                                                                                                                                             
13) Rui Henrique Alves, Oscar Afonso, “The New Stability and Growth Pact: More Flexible, Less 
Stupid?”, Intereconomics, Volume 42, Issue 4, pages 218-225, 2007                                                     
14) Tilman Bruck, Rudolf Zwiener, “Fiscal policy for stabilization and growth: A simulation analysis 
of deficit and expenditure targets in a Monetary Union”, German Institute for Economic Research, 
January 2004 
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Although, Monetary Union does not assume a bail out, the SGP internalize the externalities 
with a fiscal policy which was almost decentralized. When we borrow money and 
simultaneously have deficits in a Monetary Union we raise interest rates. Thus, an additional 
impact in one country has also a negative impact in another. 
On the contrary, many disadvantages occur and more specifically it does not refer on how 
governments should behave in a surplus period, as we mention above, and does not allow 
exemptions from the 3% if the dept is below 60% of GDP. Nevertheless, sanctions from the 
Commission are not automatic and predictable. 
 
3   The use of fiscal policy in the preparation of EU budget 
As we all know, the budget of EU is the only instrument for the implementation of fiscal 
policy in EU. Bearing in mind that EU is a complex economic and political organization, we 
could say that only a small number of functions which have something in common are 
financed. 
Budgetary revenues and expenditures come from fiscal policy due to its impact on aggregate 
demand. The intervention of fiscal policy on aggregate demand could be achieved with firstly: 
automatic stabilizers, secondly with discretionary fiscal policy or finally with the 
establishment of new rules (15). 
 
3.1   Dimensions of fiscal framework 
Moreover, the European framework could be summarized along three dimensions: the long-
term, the medium-term and the short-term perspective. 
 
Long term perspective 
The aim of long term perspective is to protect the sustainability of public finances and for that 
European framework uses an indicator showing the budgetary efforts that are needed in order 
to stabilize the GDP-ratio dept. 
In the example below we could see that the European indicator in comparison with a Dutch 
national indicator does not improve the sustainability through the years having at last a 
negative mark of -4,5% in 2016. 
 
 
15) Jurković, P., “ Fiskalna politika u ekonomskoj teoriji i praksi”,  Zagreb, 1989 
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Fiscal sustainability report is based on a no-policy-change assumption and requires a higher 
level of detail and credibility to be included. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of sustainability indicators 
 
                                                                     
Source: European Commission 
 
However, there are some differences between the two indicators. EU methodology indicates a 
constant share of indirect tax revenues for the GDP (16). 
 
Medium-term perspective 
 Medium term objective (MTO) is an integral part of preventive arm because it illustrates the 
country’s budgetary objective defined as a target value for structural balance. There are three 
reasons of medium-term objectives. The first one is that it represents a safety scope for the 
3% of threshold responsible for deficits. Secondly it secures fiscal sustainability by stabilizing 
dept to 60% of GDP. Thirdly, MTO allows budgetary manoeuvre for all public investments. 
 
 
 
 
16) Hauke Vierke, Maarten Masselink, “The Dutch budgetary framework and the European fiscal 
rules”, European Commission , Economic Brief 027, May, 2017 
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Short-term perspective 
The short-term perspective is related with the annual budgetary aims. Regarding European 
framework, every fiscal rule is examined annually by the Commission. Member-states that 
have not adjusted their MTO should make reforms in order to reach it and at the same time to 
maintain their budgetary position by letting the automatic stabilization to work independently. 
The evaluation of the short-term budgetary position is recognized mainly by two indicators. 
The first on is the structural balance pillar which measures the distance of the structural 
balance from MTO and the convergence towards it and the second one is the expenditure 
benchmark which points a reference ratio for public expenditure growth based on the 
economy’s potential growth rate. 
 
3.2   Cyclically Adjusted Balance in the EU fiscal framework 
Cyclically adjusted framework was pioneer in the fiscal surveillance of EU framework. Along 
with the revised SGP of 2005 the balance adjusted for cyclical effect became an indicator for 
state’s medium–term fiscal objective (MTO) under the preventive arm and the assessment of 
effective actions in a case of fiscal deficit procedure like the corrective arm. The preventive 
arm secures sound fiscal policies leading to sound public finances in a short or long term 
period by requiring member-states to ensure a specific MTO for their budgetary positions. On 
the other hand for countries that do not reach MTO, an appropriate adjustment in their MTO 
with a rate of 0,5% of GDP improvement every year is very important. By setting these rules 
the preventive arm secures finally the sound fiscal medium-term sustainability, allowing at 
the same time free operation of automatic stabilizers. On the other hand, corrective arm for 
member-states with excessive deficits to have a minimum annual improvement of 0,5% of 
GDP as a benchmark in structural terms (17). 
Moreover, CAB elucidates important fiscal aspects and makes easier the decomposition of 
fiscal positions in the automatic fiscal response of the budge to changes. Apart from that, 
CAB is useful for the evaluation of fiscal sustainability issues. One characteristic of major 
importance is the avoidance of mistakes during the assessment of the potential output during 
crises. 
As mentioned before, after the reform of SGP, CAB has been strengthened with the Six –Pack 
of December 2011 which strengthens requirements on SGP by specifying when mistakes 
regarding cyclically adjusted balance are significant and if members would not comply with 
these rules the last step is the settlement of sanctions.  
 
 
17) Martin Larch, Alessandro Turrini, “The cyclically adjusted budget balance in the EU policy 
making”, Economic Paper 374, European Commission, March, 2009 
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Also, with the so-called fiscal compact of March 2012, member-states argued to establish 
rules like that of preventive arm to measure their deficits. So, when a deviation or a leeway of 
CAB from the MTO will occur, the national correction mechanisms will be set in force. 
A CAB approach of ’’top-down’’ is a discretionary fiscal policy for non-structural elements. 
An annual change in the CAB could be interpreted as a discretionary fiscal policy. ‘’Bottom-
up ‘’ approach is the opposite and it considers the sum of the budgetary impact of 
discretionary budgetary measures. 
The methodology of CAB in European framework has been meliorated by the Commission 
and its amendments has been reviewed by the Output Gap Working Group (OGWG) and 
confirmed by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) (18) . 
 
 
4   Types and size of revenue in EU budget 
The budget of EU has its own resources. The maximum amount to which member-states can 
contribute is up to 1.27% of Gross National Income (GNI) of EU. The revenues of the budget 
are divided into these categories: 
1) Custom duties which are duties that are collected according to Common Custom Tariff on 
the import of a variety of products outside of the EU                                                                         
2)Agricultural duties which are the duties from the import of farm products                                           
3) Revenues from VAT according to a specific rate on a standard tax base which is 
established according to EU rules. In 1999 this base was not allowed to exceed 50% of the 
GNI.                                                                                                                                                                
4) Revenue as a percentage of GNI of EU’s Member-States. The calculation of this revenue 
become with a specific procedure that a rate is formulated to the difference between GNI and 
the VAT base.                                                                                                                                                                  
5) Other sources like income taxes, fees, fines and interests from EU’s personnel and from 
EU’s institutions.              
 
 
 
 
 
 
18) Gilles Mourre, George Marian Isbasoiu, Dareo Paterrnoster, Matteo Salto , “The cyclically 
adjusted budget balance: an update”, Economic Paper 478, European Commission, March, 2013 
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Example of EU’s Budgetary Revenues 
 
Table 1: EU Budgetary Revenue (in % of total revenue) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 
Import duties 10.7 11.0 10.2 
Agricultural duties 1.5 1.5 1.2 
Collection costs -2.1 – – 
Revenue accruing from VAT 23.6 24.7 14.4 
Revenue accruing from GNI 48.7 60.9 73.4 
Other duties 17.6 1.9 0.8 
Total revenue (billion euros) 95.7 97.5 99.7 
Total revenue [resources] (% of GDP of EU 15)a 1.04 1.05 1.03 
Source: European Commission (2003; 2004b) 
 
As we can see, EU’s revenues in table 1 in the last few years occur mostly by VAT and GNI 
which account both more than 80% of total revenues. Apparently, a fall in VAT is quite 
logical because of the reduction of the single rate in the harmonized tax base of EU member-
states while at the same time the opposite occurs for GNI’s revenues. However, in this table it 
is illustrated the ratio of EU’s budgetary revenues and the GDP of member-states in that time 
period which is only 1% and indicated a very small scale of EU budget compared with the 
GDP of EU. 
Despite EU’s own revenues sources, the base of revenues is different from the base of the 
classic budgets of nation states. EU’s revenues derive from tax revenues of the national 
budgets of member-states controlled by national governments. Additionally, budget of EU has 
not classic tax base like VAT for example, income tax or profit tax. Also, regarding EU’s 
revenues, central budget gathers most of the tax revenues and provide an assist in the lower 
levels of government through various transfers. On the opposite side, member-states have 
their own tax revenues from where EU’s revenues come from. So, we conclude that EU’s 
budget does not participate in any redistribution or allocation of resources mainly due to its 
size. 
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5   Types and size of expenditure in EU budget 
Financial Perspective is an instrument with which EU forms and shapes the budgetary 
discipline with the creation of a standard base analyzing any available revenues. Respectively, 
EU’s budgetary expenditures are designed over the medium term as part of the system of 
Financial Perspective.  
As for the Financial Perspective system, it was established through to an inter-institutional 
agreement between the European Council, the Commission and the Parliament. This system 
was created because of budgetary crises in 80’s century. Two were the most significant 
reasons for the creation of this peculiar system. The first one was the disproportion of 
revenues and expenditures while the second one was the advanced and significant role of 
European Parliament in decision making of the EU. Nevertheless, frictions and conflicts were 
created between European Council and European Parliament with a negative aspect in the 
formation and adaption of the budget leading to the creation of a delay. 
After the small historical reference, resources of EU’s budgetary expenditure are redistributed 
for the development and the implementation of common policies of EU where specific areas 
of EU are financed. Consequently, EU’s budgetary expenditures are divided into seven 
categories. 
1) In the agriculture group there exist expenditures for the CAP (Common Agriculture Policy) 
and more specifically expenditures of the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). A major part of CAP is used to provide standard 
prices for the farm products of domestic producers.                                                                             
2) The second category is structural operations. Expenditures for structural policy cover the 
domain of regional and social policy. The majority of these recourses are distributed to the 
Structural Funds like the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), to the EAGGF’s 
Social Fund like the ESF and lastly to the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG). As for the size of structural operations’ expenditures, the referred ones are the biggest 
in EU budget after agricultural expenditures.                                                                             
3) Internal policy is the third category of budgetary expenditures and they are divided into 
five sets which are for example expenditures for transport, education, culture, employment, 
nuclear protection, media, energy policy, activities related to internal market, research, justice 
and security.                                                                                                                                  
4) Foreign activities is also a category and it conclude activities related with expenses for 
assistance to countries outside of the EU, except those categorized into expenditures for the 
enlargement of the EU and the ERDF. Such examples are food aid costs, charitable aid and 
programs related with the collaboration of Balkan countries, former USSR, Mediterranean 
countries and others in the whole world.                                                                                                               
5) Administrative costs are related with the costs of European Union institutions and 
establishments while the Commission has the biggest percentage of those costs with 60% 
followed by the Parliament with 20%, the Council, the Court of Justice and lastly the Court of 
Auditors.                       
31 
 6)  The next category is the reserves where there are three kinds of these. The first one is 
monetary reserves, the second one is reserves for emergency aid and the last one is guarantee 
reserves. In a case of an unpredictable condition where an additional expenditure will be 
needed for the execution of the budget those funds will be used.                                                 
7) The last group of EU budgetary expenditure is the assistance to future members regarding 
mainly foreign activities but due to its significance and the amounts of the costs it is regulated 
apart. This group is about the finance of future EU members which are divided into two 
groups. The first group is the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the second one is 
the Mediterranean countries. The assistance is allocated through three programs , the 
SAPARD for agriculture, the PHARE for the aid to the countries of CEE and ISPA through 
which infrastructure projects in transport and environmental protection are financed. 
 
Example of EU’s Budgetary Expenditures 
 
Table 2: EU budget expenditure (in % of total expenditure) 
 2002 2003 2004 
Agriculture – CAP 46.3 46.4 42.7 
Structural operations 33.4 33.3 35.6 
Home affairs 6.5 6.7 7.6 
Foreign affairs 4.8 4.9 4.4 
Administration 5.0 5.1 5.2 
Reserves 0.7 0.4 0.4 
Aid to future members 3.3 3.3 3.0 
Total expenditure (billion euros) 100.6 102.1 115.4 
Total expenditure (as % of GDP of EU 15)a 1.09 1.1 1.18 
Author’s calculation,  Source: According to the European Commission (2004b) 
 
As we can see, during the last few years the ratio of expenditures for the CAP and structural 
operations in EU budget has changed with the last to be benefited more than the first. The 
reason is simple and it is to create an efficient economic environment beyond the borders of 
EU opposing the creation of competitiveness by custom duties and quotas. 
 Apparently budgetary expenditures are quite restricted in a small specter compared to other 
nation-states. Two big groups of expenditure are the common agricultural policy and the 
structural policy. Sectors like insurance, health care, education and defence have a descent 
analogy in national budgets but these sectors contribute to the service of national or public 
debts. In EU budget there is no contribution to the dept creating this way a different allocation 
of budget resources (19). 
 
19) Hrvoje Šimovic, “The European Union Budget”, Review article UDC 336.12(4-67 EU) 
JEL H72, March, 2005 
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CHAPTER III 
The European Court of Auditors as the EU’s independent external 
audit body 
 
‘’ Two-thirds of the Earth’s surface is covered with water. The other third is covered with auditors 
from headquarters.’’ 
- Norman Ralph Augustine 
 
Introduction 
In an international organization like European Union there is a necessity of an audit institution 
like ECA. Due to the high responsibility of financial transactions and money collection of the 
organs of European Commission, an audit body seems to be the appropriate solution for the 
regulation of such things. Charged with the responsibility of supervision and auditing, ECA 
ensures the transparency and the sound management of public resources along with the 
supervision of the interests of EU’s taxpayers.  
 
1    Historical background of European Court of Auditors 
The audit control in the EU during the first years was implemented by each Community. The 
benchmark for the evolution of audit control was the Merger Treaty on 8 April 1965 which in 
fact replaced any previous audit body and established the Audit Board of the European 
Communities. Correspondingly, the overall budget of the European Economic Community 
and from the European Atomic Energy Community was managed by an Audit Board. 
However, after the join of at least three or four European powerful nations in the sector of 
independent public administration auditing, the need for an establishment of a common 
European audit system was more than imperative. After collaboration and long-term 
negotiations between the three bigger organs of EU (Parliament, Commission, Council), the 
signing of the Second Budget Treaty on July 22 1975 in Brussels established officially a 
European Court of Auditors. 
 The enlargement of the amounts in the transactions between funds in the European 
Community made a mandatory necessity the upgrade to a stronger and more independent 
body. On 1993 the Treaty on European Union made the ECA an institution just like the 
already existed Parliament, Council, Commission and the Court of Justice. Also this Treaty 
required in some way the ECA to provide the Parliament and the Council with Statements of 
Assurance on a regular basis regarding the liability of European transactions. 
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Further legal competences were aggregated to ECA after the signing of Amsterdam Treaty on 
October 2 1997 altering many provisions such as like the range of the audit competences 
including any pertinent European institution, natural liable legal person to European interests 
with regard to revenues and expenditures in all of the EU’s premises across European 
community. 
Lastly, according to Nice Treaty on February 1 2003, few more alterations were added 
apropos the establishment of internal chambers for better management inside the ECA and 
also the amelioration of relationships and cooperation between ECA and national audit 
bodies. 
 
The exact location of ECA is in Luxembourg. 
 
2   The institutional position of ECA and its legal basis 
At first ECA was not deemed as a European institution. In fact, the ECJ clarified its opinion 
by mentioning that ECA was an institution that appertained to the whole European 
Community with regard to Staff Regulations.  
However, Treaty on EU with article 13 recognized ECA as a EU’s institution. 
Correspondingly, articles 285-287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). More specifically, under article 285 ECA should be the responsible institution for 
the audit in EU and moreover it should consists of one national of each member state. Article 
286 refers to the terms of appointment and the terms of the office of member of the ECA and 
lastly article 287 regulates the annual report that have to be presented by the end of each 
financial year along with other special reports and opinions (20). 
The Court did not have legal power until the Maastricht Treaty when became the fifth 
institution. However, after been benefited with further authority, since the ECA could only 
supervised the first pillar such as the European Community pillar which is related with social, 
environmental and economic policies, the Treaty of Amsterdam came to transmit full audit 
power to the ECA concerning the whole EU structure. 
It is also worth notable that Maastricht Treaty solved any kind of vagueness irrevocably 
regarding the institutional status. After Maastricht Treaty, the treaty of Amsterdam altered 
article 5 of the EU Treaty leading officially to the ECA’s entry to the institutions of EU. 
 
 
 
20) Eric Davies, “Information Guide on the European Court of Auditors”, European Sources Online, 
November 2013 
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3   Administrative and operational organization of ECA 
3.1   Members of ECA  
The operation of ECA is as a collegial body of 28 members which is one for each State. All 
the audit reports and the opinions are adopted in some way by this body concerning all the 
decisions for the ECA’s organization and administration. 
Indeed, all relevant provisions about membership are included in the article 247. However, no 
provision in the Treaty is referred into the nationality of each member in the ECA. The time 
period for the designation of members is a six-year term. 
Furthermore, the democratic character of the European Union seems to have a tension of 
increase due to the Parliament’s involvement in the designation of officials in European 
bodies. However, if the Parliament deems that one candidate does not have the appropriate 
qualifications and assets ,then after a thorough examination, it may express its disapproval 
because the candidate might not be suitable for this job. The whole procedure of a candidate’s 
appointment, with the consultation of Parliament’s opinion, indicates the solidity and the 
durability of the European structure. 
One more crucial factor along with other ethical guidelines in the membership of the Court is 
the impartiality of each one of the members. By using the term impartiality we infer that any 
of the ECA members shall refrain from any kind of action that could be detrimental for 
decision-taking. More specifically, according to the ethical guidelines for the ECA which is a 
seven pages index written by the ECA in 2011, a specific regulation about the appropriate 
behavior is registered. Articles 3.6 until 3.9 reveal these regulations (21). There are plenty of 
those articles regulating trust, credibility, integrity as well as independence and objectivity of 
the ECA members. 
Finally, we could add that only the ECA has the competence to determine whether a member 
is absolutely in accordance with the Treaty’s conditions and ECJ could help that way by 
removing and depriving of their rights any of those members. The last one where only the 
ECA could ask for their removal indicates its independence. Lastly, the termination of a 
member’s duties could occurs either by his demise, either by replacement either by his 
resignation. 
The President of ECA is elected for a renewable term of three years by the Members and 
ensures the sound financial operation and implementation of the institution. The current 
President of ECA is the German Member Klaus-Heiner Lehne. 
 
 
 
21) “Ethical guidelines for the European Court of Auditors”, Adopted by the European Court of 
Auditors, 20 October 2011 
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3.2   Personnel of ECA  
Contrary to the appointment of the members, for the personnel there is no exactly provision. 
The last one means that when it comes to the personnel the ECA has the absolute 
responsibility about their appointment. 
Firstly, because of the ignorance about ECA’s functioning needs the new institution was 
recruited by the personnel of the Audit Board and the ECSC Auditor. However, there is a 
division of the staff into two categories which are 1) the auditors and 2) the administrative 
personnel. The second category, the administrative personnel, is also divided into those 
dealing with administrative services in general, like personnel and budget for example, those 
dealing with translation and interpretation of ECA’s documents and those dealing with 
general services like library and professional training. Also, personnel are at the disposal of 
members of ECA in their cabinets mainly as helping staff. 
The selection of auditors comes after intense survey regarding their qualifications while they 
are selected by a wide majority of professional backgrounds like audit, finance and law. 
Nonetheless, the complex audit system of each State demands high quality audit personnel 
with various assets in their professional career like being bilingual for example.   
High professional standards, independence from external interventions, comprehension of the 
already existing system of internal audit in the organization under audit along with the high 
responsibility to perform the duties as an ECA personnel by preparing reports and performing 
audits are mainly some of the criteria for an auditor (including ECA auditors). 
Due to the heterogeneity because of the origin of candidates from all Member-States, ECA 
has established a Training and Working Methods Service in order to supply its staff with the 
appropriate guidelines and train them with various programs (22). 
 
3.3   Organization 
The organization of ECA is regulated by EC Treaty where first of all a President is elected 
among their members for a three years term, given also the opportunity for his re-election. 
However, ECA acts as a corporate body which according to the article 248 of the EC Treaty is 
clearly stated that any of the decisions in the Court shall be taken by a majority of its 
members. This kind of cooperation has been achieved and made the conduct between 
members much easier by sharing the competences and the responsibilities among them. 
Working that way, it makes the ECA’s members to have fewer conflicts and also to facilitate 
the general function of the Court for the preparation and implementation of Court’s decisions 
in particular areas. 
 
22) Skiadas Dimitrios, “European court of auditors: the financial conscience of the European Union”, 
Durham Theses, University of Durham, 1998 
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As we proceed to the analysis of the tasks we could mention that they are divided into 
vertically and horizontal tasks. Vertical tasks deal with audit operations and investigation 
activities of the ECA while on the other hand horizontal tasks deal with the internal activities 
of the Court like the working schedule, the intersectional coordination and the administration 
of the ECA’s personnel. 
Apart from the tasks, ECA is also divided into five audit groups. More specifically, each of 
these groups is comprised by three or five members. Only one member is the responsible head 
(chief) for his group and commands his group in order to gain the appropriate audit results by 
the end of each year. 
 
Table 3 : Five groups of ECA  
 
Source: The European Court of Auditors, Skiadas Dimitrios 
 
 
A small analysis of the table illustrates that the first group deals with the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).The second deals with the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), Cohesion Fund etc. 
Group 3 is responsible for European Development Funds, own resources and administrative 
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expenses while the Audit Developments and Reports group deals with annual reports and the 
coordination. Lastly, the Statement of assurance group helps the supporting accounting work. 
The rest of the members are entitled and delegated, along with the staff of ECA, to 
accomplish the tasks assigned to them and when they do so they present their results in front 
of the other members. 
 In conclusion, the place of ECA as the Court’s Seat was temporary placed in Luxembourg. 
Nevertheless, the European Council approved the current location of ECA with a specific 
decision on the seats of the existing institutions. In that event, criticisms were showed up 
because of the 200km distance between the rest of the Europeans institutions and the ECA. 
Nonetheless, the creation of “liaison” officers due to the implementation of Communities’ 
policies by the national authorities was imperative. The new officers were located into the 
national audit institutions and improved the implementation of EU policies. 
 
 
4    Scope and extent of ECA’s competences  
The competences of the Court are regulated by the EC Treaty and more specifically on article 
246 where is stated that ECA should be the pertinent body for the audit. One more article 
which is 188a and states more specifically that ECA’s primary task is to examine all revenues 
and expenditures from Community’s accounts. 
However, one difference that needs to be cleared is the kind of audit from the Audit Board 
and from the ECA. Regarding the first one, it can only examine revenues and expenditures 
shown in the budget while on the other hand ECA has no limits in its audit even when 
controlling revenues and expenditures from outside of the general budget. 
Among its competences the examination of European’s Development Fund (EDF) and 
European’s Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by preparing an annual report controlling and 
auditing that way all kind of their transactions. Furthermore, the EC Treaty obliges the 
extensive audit of member states of European’s Free Trade Association (EFTA) transactions. 
A series of organizations are being examined by ECA, like the Decentralized Community 
Bodies, the Euratom Supply Agency etc. 
On the contrary, all those resources which are managed by national authorities on behalf of 
the European Commission are appertained to the ECA’s audit. Regardless how unacceptable 
and difficult is for national authorities to be under the examination of ECA, they often make 
political compromises and favors in order to be reelected and support their political decisions. 
It is obvious that when ECA examines their economic data and accounts, many irregularities 
and inaccuracies to be found. 
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5   Products, annual report and opinions of ECA  
5.1   Statement of Assurance 
With regard to the legality of EU’s transactions the ECA supply annually the European 
Parliament and the European Council with a Statement of Assurance (SoA). Only on 
accordance with the mandate there is an examination on whether EU budget is in compliance 
with the applicable rules (23).  
In practice, European financial regulations and national rules and legislations are considered.    
Against overall opinion specific assessments regarding selected areas of EU budget including 
cohesion policies are provided. It is obvious that all this kind of work and audit demands 
plenty of time in order to be completed because the Court has to conduct an examination of 
expenditures until the last recipient of EU’s funds. 
In the case where huge irregularities are to be found during the survey the Court has every 
right to postpone and refuse the production of the Statement of Assurance. There were many 
occasions of postponing the Statement during the past few years like 1994 until 1998 because 
of high rate of errors concerning transactions. So, if ECA deems that an alteration needs to be 
done for an institution or a body then ECA obliges the latter one to comply with its rules and 
its alteration otherwise there would be negative comments in the Court’s Annual Report and a 
postpone of the production of Statement of Assurance. 
The SoA has contributed much progress through the last 20 years in EU financial 
management. Indeed, SoA’s approach is absolutely right while we all recall that all those 
previous years internal budget control was weak and European Commission couldn’t provide 
many information about the legality and the regularity of EU’s spending. European 
Parliament demanded for more geographical and fund-specific insights into EU’s financial 
management.  
Lastly, efforts were made in order to increase the added value of SoA, providing that way a 
better audit for EU budget (24). 
 
 
 
 
 
23) “The ECA’s modified approach to the Statement of Assurance audits in Cohesion’’, Background 
Paper, European Court of Auditors, December 2017  
24) “Fostering trust through independent audit “, European Court of Auditors’ strategy for 2018-2020, 
June 2017   
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5.2   Annual report 
Every year an annual report is produced by the ECA which presents its results and replies of 
the auditees to its comments. The ECA transmits to the Commission and any institution 
concerned only by 15 of July of each year, any comments that should be in the annual report, 
after a complex and long procedure of examination.  
The deadline for the response of the institution been audited is the latest until 31 of October 
and all of the ECA’s comments are confidential and under absolute secrecy and privacy. The 
continuation of the whole procedure is with the transmission of the annual report along with 
the institution’s report from the ECA to the pertinent authority for giving discharge only until 
30 of November. Meanwhile, the publication in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities ( OJ) ensures the legality of the annual report. 
Additionally, the annual reports ensure the soundness of the financial management while on 
the other hand the ECA must ensures that the responses of each institution will be published 
right after its comments. 
On the comparison, many problems have been during the cooperation of ECA and the 
Commission but progress has been made with firstly the addition with statistical information 
to the annual report from ECA facilitating that way the Commission regarding the EU’s 
finances. Secondly, ECA tried to facilitate the budget discharge and after having many 
disagreements with the Commission, regarding the reports’ comments then in 1982 the two 
institutions came with an agreement establishing a new procedure which is described in the 
Financial regulations. 
 
5.3   Special reports-Opinions 
Except from the SoA and the annual reports, the ECA provides some special reports for an 
issue that might emerge or after a demand of a European institution. There is a difference 
between the way of annual’s reports and special report’s preparation. With greater time 
flexibility than annual reports, special reports search in depth any kind of problem that occurs 
and despite their content complexity they are more easily handled by the authorities to whom 
they are addressed. Many different opinions have been expressed and one of those is that 
there is not always plenty of time for special reports to be examined by the EU institutions but 
it is obvious that it is not true because the contribution of special reports in the discharge 
procedure is huge. 
As for the opinions of ECA anything that concerns them by the ECA must be characterized as 
‘’Consultative Competence’’. There are two kinds of them. Firstly there are opinions which 
are not obligatory for an institution but it is for its financial good to follow them and secondly 
opinions from ECA to the Council concerning the establishment and the implementation of 
the budget. The Council could act without taking consideration of the ECA’s opinion but it is 
widely known that those kind of opinions also published in the OJ have some kind of further 
weight for the EU’s decision making. 
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5.4   Example of ECA’s products 
 
 
Table 4: Reports of the Court of Auditors 1993–1998 
 
Source: Annex 3, 1998 Annual Report of the Court of 
Auditors. 
 
 
One fact is that in 1990 the visibility of Court’s reports increased considerably (25).The 
continuous annual’s reports coverage by the media was obvious that period.However, in 1997  
the ECA altered a little bit the content of annual reports and products. 
 
The products of ECA became part of the discharge procedure in European Parliament and in 
European Council because of its validity. Therefore, the ECA established a new policy for its 
products which deals sometimes with more specific sectors through its special reports. 
 
 Using this method, the Court differentiated between its general response to Union’s 
budgetary programs and in its detailed observations on specific programs and practices. It is 
obvious that according to table 4 above the number of special annual reports and the number 
of special reports are quite bigger than the other two of the table. Consequently this new 
approach of ECA continued also in the latter years. 
 
 
 
 
 
25)  Brigid Laffan, “Auditing and accountability in the European Union’’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 2003 
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Table 5: Focus of Court of Auditor’s Special Reports in 1998 
 
 
In accordance with the previous table 4 brief analysis, in table 5 we could see analytically the 
categories of the 1998 special reports. Special reports had a very important role in the ECA’s 
activities that period and ECA’s emphasis on them is illustrated in table 5. 
More specifically, a big part of ECA’s audit takes the EU’s internal policies concerning the 
CAP and structural expenditure followed by six special reports regarding external expenditure 
multiplying that way the EU’s budget. 
The last two reports of the Co-ordination of Fraud Prevention (Unite de Co-ordination de la 
Lutte Anti-Fraude – UCLAF) and the allowances paid to Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) had a goal to audit practices in the institutions of EU. 
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5.5   Auditee’s replies 
The ECA gives the opportunity to the institution been audited to reply to its findings and to 
formulate counter-arguments. This kind of procedure is also known as ‘’Contradictory 
Procedure’’ where the audited institution has the right to reply for ECA’s findings.  
For this reason, the legality and the cooperation is succeeded through the right of the auditee 
to reply to the report received. The aim is to make the institution conform to the rules of 
financial management and legality. 
This kind of ‘’dialogue’’ between the institutions and the ECA secures the prudent 
cooperation among them and helps them create better relations and collaboration in a possible 
future problem. 
 
 
6   Principles of ECA’s audit and auditing methods  
Principles of legality, regularity and sound financial management 
The ECA conducts its audit under specific principles with follows them in order to achieve 
the greatest result. ECA examines all payments as to legality and regularity and whether they 
are in accordance with legal provisions like sectoral regulations, conventions, mandates, 
agreements and contracts. As for the legality audit ECA examines also its compatibility with 
EU’s Treaties and legislations like budget, financial regulations and internal management 
rules. The Court except of the examination of Communities accounting system it also respects 
during its audit the budgetary rules and it reports any case of fraud. 
Regarding sound financial management there are three aspects of management and those are: 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Economy illustrates the examination with the least 
expensive means of achieving a goal, efficiency illustrates the means adopted in the best 
manner and effectiveness measures in what degree the target has achieved. However, ECA 
should not search for the reasons that any decision has been taken by EU’s institutions but it 
will investigate whether the financial implementation was adequate. 
The biggest problem of ECA’s finding could be detected on whether it should cross the line 
between presenting its findings and whether it makes political suggestions. There is much 
criticism regarding its competences but for many it is reasonable because ECA could not 
impose sanctions so it makes political suggestions in order to prevent fraud in EU’s 
transactions. 
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7   The existence of fraud and corruption in EU and the role of ECA  
 
Given the definition of fraud and corruption we could say that it is the reduction of economic 
performance of a country especially in its long-term economic growth, affecting mainly 
investments, taxation, public expenditure and human development (26).Fraud is an omission by 
deceiving others resulting in victims suffering and corruption is any act of omission which 
measures official authority. The European Commission is responsible for the protection of 
European’s citizen finances. EC shares the responsibility to Member states through the areas 
of EU’s budget shared management and of Traditional Own Resources (TOR). The term fraud 
regarding EU’s finances is a lengthy one and it is referred in the "Convention on the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests”. Nevertheless, there exist many 
institutions and bodies in EU that combating with fraud. More specifically: 
 
Figure 5 : EU and Member State bodies involved in managing the risk of fraud 
Source: ECA 
 
26) “ Fighting fraud in EU spending”, Audit brief, European Court of Auditors, October 2017 
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At first, issues of fraudulent use of EU’s resources were brought to public by media coverage 
of 1993 Annual report of ECA which was published on 15 November 1994 (27). As we pointed 
out previously, the Court has to examine the legality, the regularity of all transactions and 
whether they comply with the existent regulations of numerous policies and schemes at EU 
and national level without omitting the administrative error due to the large legal and 
bureaucratic complexities. 
 
The frauds detected are not a priori fraudulent and ECA recommend their alteration in order 
to comply with the appropriate law. In contrast, irregularities that are intentional breach of 
laws are considered as fraud. For that reason ECA has suggested that when many auditing 
systems are weak the flows of funds through them should be suspended until an alteration in 
laws will to be taken. 
 
 
7.1   Dimensions of fraud in EU 
 
The EU’s problem of fraud has four dimensions. The first one has a relation with ‘’direct 
effects’’ which means that resources of money are distributed wrongly and not under the 
criteria of Communities’ rules and policies. Secondly, ‘’indirect effects’’ affect the external 
opinion about the European Community regarding the public opinion and the capacity of EU 
to reach further goals. Thirdly, the next dimension affects the collaboration between EU and 
Member States along with the whole course towards european integration. Lastly, the last 
dimension is that the fraud gives an extra motive to EU for an organizational rebuilt of the 
European Communities which is based in the institutions’ reports for fraud limitation. 
 
 
7.2   Reasons facilitating fraud and corruption 
 
In order to locate the main reasons concerning these kind of irregularities maybe we should 
search in the foundations of EU.  The current structural dimension is characterized as a 
complex system of transactions between European Community and national agencies which is 
very vulnerable to fraud. On the contrast, the current situation regarding the European 
integration does not favor any different system to be implemented. 
 
One more fraudulent activity that may not come so easily in our mind is the corruption of 
high European officials. Elaborating more into this issue we could easily distinguish that the 
lack of accountability of officials leads to this behavior.  Since the control system of European 
Commission absolves everyone from any financial responsibility then policy makers and 
operators have always an alibi.  
 
Highlighting the present spending culture of the European Communities where spending is 
more important than deciding priorities or obtaining value for money, we could understand 
that there exist a fertile background for officials to turn into fraud and corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
27) Terrence James & Neil Usher, “Fraud and the audit of the EU budget”, Public Money & 
Management, 1995 
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7.3   Identification of a fraudulent activity 
 
When we have to deal with fraudulent activities in EU we have to confirm firstly many 
circumstances. The first one is that we have to acknowledge which behavior is characterized 
as fraudulent, then to identify its characteristics and lastly to identify the criminal nature of 
these activities and to recognize the incompetence of EU’s institutions to tackle it. 
 
The solution of these problems came with the following measures taken. For the first problem 
the implementation and the management of EU’s budget was the point of reference of fraud. 
For the second problem the solution came by using these concepts of fraud that were 
established in the Member-States. The third problem is more complicated than the others and 
has its roots in the unwillingness of member states to transfer their powers regarding their 
criminal systems. That’s why they do not give many of their legal power to European 
institutions. 
 
In the past, there was no a Community definition about fraudulent activities. Until 1995 there 
was only one brief reference by the ECA in its annual reports. At first, there was used the 
term “irregularities”. 
 
Lately, one legislative definition of fraud in European Communities was given in the 
Convention of the Protection of European Communities’ financial interests which was close 
enough to the one given by the ECA.   
 
In 1995 measures have been taken in order to tackle fraud and corruption with the Protocol to 
the PFI Convention and one Convention against corruption by officials of European 
Communities or officials of member states of EU. However, “loopholes” on such provisions 
exist because there is not the appropriate criminal law scheme against such phenomena. 
 
In order to tackle any corruption and fraud a research group which name was the Association 
of European Lawyers was formed for the preparation of relevant studies. The 1997 study 
named “Corpus Juris” tried to tackle fraud and make and attempt to establish a European 
System of criminal procedure involving the European Public Prosecutor”, the whole 
prosecution procedure and special national courts. 
 
More specifically, the Corpus Juris has two parts. The first has substantial provisions about 
punishable offences while the second contains provisions about criminal procedure, 
investigations and trial structures. 
 
Corpus Juris facilitated the manner and the mode of frauds’ solutions. However, there was not 
a mechanism for the protection of human rights of a person involved in a criminal activity. 
For this reason it is necessary for human rights to be ensured even before the establishment of 
such prosecuting schemes because EU should not sacrifice all of its principles in the name of 
fraud and corruption combating. 
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7.4   The role of ECA in combating fraud and corruption 
 
The actual point is that the ECA is that its main priority is the deterrence and the prevention 
of fraud and not its detection. While the ECA was deemed that it was created only for 
combating individual occasions of fraud the truth is that ECA gives recommendations on 
general issues.  
 
Therefore, ECA in its reports should investigate any irregularity concerning the management 
of Communities’ resources at national and EU level. As for the issue of corruption (active or 
passive) the ECA has established the same prevention like the fraud by informing if it is 
needed and other European institutions and member states but not again searching for specific 
cases of corruption. Analyzing the previous statement, many occasions of corruption are 
detected by the ECA but its competences are limited and it does not investigate if and whether 
an official personnel is bribed or not. It is notable that the latter task is a competence of others 
EU institutions and does not included in any of ECA’s jurisdiction.  
 
The cornerstone maybe for a number of reforms came in 1997 where an OECD’s inquiry 
suggested and presented a number of anti-corruption measures. The most important of them 
are firstly the existence and operation of a supreme national audit authority which is 
independent of any government and its competences are to investigate, regulate and report 
any financial management. Secondly, the necessity of a system of financial management 
controls in order to prevent and deter corruption practices.  
 
After one year in 1998, a recommendation was adopted by OECD for ensuring the ethical 
conduct in any public service where more specifically anticorruption measures were taken 
into consideration and member states were recommended inter alia to apply such policies. For 
this reason only an institution like ECA could ensure to counter corruption and deter it. 
 
Nonetheless, ECA’s reports are not included into provisions for criminal law by the European 
Commission but it is an urgency to include provisions regarding the cooperation of ECA 
along with national and European authorities like Europol for example which carries out 
researches concerning this kind of issues.  
 
From 1997 and on, namely from Amsterdam Treaty and on, the European institutions when it 
comes to fraud and corruption issues then they consult the ECA which is the pertinent 
European institution.  
 
As for the already existing Community legislation on fraud and corruption it is deemed that it 
is beyond ECA’s competences and jurisdiction. On the contrary, when the legislation above is 
used as a management handbook then it can be scrutinized and receive amendments including 
also the alteration of its legislative rules.  
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8   The European Anti-Fraud Office 
 
8.1   Historical background, institutional position of OLAF and its legal base 
 
It is true that the cooperation between European institutions against fraud and corruption is 
something common and quite rational. Similar previous efforts were made in the past in order 
to control such occasions. One example is the 1988 Commission’s Coordinating Unit for the 
Fight Against Fraud (CUFAF) for the prevention and the suppression of fraud along with the 
cooperation with other institutions and member states. The change became in 1999 when the 
previous institution was replaced by a new one named OLAF (Office européen de lutte 
antifraude in French) which is the European Anti-Fraud Office. Its main characteristics are 
that it is operationally independent from any European institution and thereafter it does not 
have legal personality. 
 
OLAF’s mission is to protect the financial interest of the EU from any kind of illegal activity. 
We should therefore bear in mind that the investigations of OLAF start after allegations. It is 
remarkable that this institution has no prosecuting power on its own. So, briefly we conclude 
that OLAF is an independent investigatory body situated within the European Commission.(28) 
 
Its legal basis for the fight against fraud lies on Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (replacing Article 280 of the EC Treaty). (29)  However, the Regulation 
No 883/2013 which governs the work of OLAF came into force on 1 October 2013 and 
strengthens the effectiveness of its investigative activities. Also, it facilitates the cooperation 
between the audit European institutions and the collaboration between other law enforcement 
bodies and third countries.OLAF has budget and administration autonomy leading to an 
operational independence. However, same aspects of its work such as the legislative and some 
‘’fraud proofing’’ functions are closely related with the Commission. The location of OLAF’s 
premises is in Brussels. 
 
 
8.2   Types of fraud and corruption combating by OLAF 
 
There are mainly two types of fraud that pertinent European institutions have to check and 
those are firstly the income and receipt fraud and secondly the expenditure fraud. Into the first 
category there are four elements and those are the agricultural levies, the custom duties 
collected on imports on the Community, a percentage of VAT and lastly a budgetary resource 
of member-states GNP. 
 
A common manner is the deliberate misstatements on custom declarations by cheating on 
value, tariff, origin and destination on custom duties and CAP. One major disaster not only 
for EU budget but also for national budgets is the concealment of the real data regarding VAT 
either these are false registration or fake taxes documentaries. On the other side, as for the 
expenditure there could be a defalcation or an abuse of the money from various European 
Social Funds or other structural funds. 
 
 
28) “Strengthening OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office”, European Union Committee, Report 
with Evidence, House of Lords, London, 2004 
29) “New OLAF Regulation enters into force”, European Anti-Fraud Office,                                       
< https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/about-us/legal-framework/memo_en >, 11 October 2013 
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8.3   Administrative and operational organization of OLAF 
 
8.3.1   Personnel of OLAF 
 
The personnel of OLAF is approximately 430 multidisciplinary staff members. The staff is 
divided into three directorates. Specifically, the directorate A is responsible for the sector of 
producing the anti-fraud strategy dealing with policy, legislation and legal affairs. Directorate 
B has the responsibility for investigations and operations which is composed by national 
auditors and investigators from national audit services and lastly directorate C is competent 
for the intelligence, operational strategy and information services and provides facilities to 
OLAF and to national authorities. It is probably the most significant directorate among the 
other three because it gathers and analyses strategic information while it monitors the 
fraudulent activities on a European basis.  
 
 
8.3.2   Director General of OLAF 
 
As for the higher officials of this body, the Director- General of OLAF is appointed by the 
European Commission after consultations with the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers for a sever year term and this term is not renewable.(30) The Director General has the 
final decision upon the appointment of OLAF’s staff. 
 
Many of his liabilities are the independence regarding his decisions. So, he does not accept 
neither seeks instructions from governments, institutions or any office and agency. The last 
liability is that the Director is entitled to bring actions against the Commission before the 
European Court of Justice if he considers that a measure of the Commission enable its 
independence into question. On the other side, the Director General might conduct any 
investigation he wants only by his own initiative. 
Recently, there was a new appointment into the position of Director-General the Mr Ville 
Itälä who is from Finland. 
 
 
8.3.3   The Supervisory Committee of OLAF  
 
At first the Supervisory Committee was established in order to supervise all of the OLAF’s 
activities. The composition of this body is made of five independent persons who are outside 
of the EU’s institutions. There have to be an agreement on their appointment followed by the 
accordance of three EU institutions. (Parliament, Council, Commission) 
 
Moving on the main competences of the Committee we should point out maybe its main one 
which is the monitoring of OLAF’s policies implementation. Therefore the Director ought to 
keep informed the Supervisory Committee concerning any of its activity along with results, 
investigations and also measures taken. 
 
 
 
30) Neil Ritchie, “European Anti-Fraud Office”, Investigations 1, centralized expenditure A.3, inquiry 
from head of sector-directorate A Neil Ritchie, 18 June, 2018 
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The Committee is also informed when the institution or the body that has been rebuked has 
failed to make any alteration or recommendations imposed by OLAF. Also it should be 
informed in cases wherever there is a reference into national judicial authorities. During the 
years according to many highest officials’ opinions and statements, the Supervisory 
Committee has become a kind of management Committee because it is involved into the 
administrative structures and decisions of OLAF. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Organization Chart of OLAF 
 
 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/anti fraud, 1/12/2018 
 
 
 
While the Supervisory Committee reports the investigations found, at the same time it also 
impose, as we previous said, its influence on those findings. This kind of audit on the results 
leads to the production of at least one report each year concerning OLAF’s activities. All of 
the reports are forwarded and submitted to the Community’s institutions.  
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8.4   Accountability of OLAF 
 
8.4.1   Liability to other institutions and bodies 
 
Apart from its independence in specific decisions and operations, this body has also liabilities 
and it has to be accountable to someone. Although, the position of OLAF is a little bit 
complex the accountability to a number of institutions is determined. 
 
Starting with the European Commission, OLAF is accountable for disciplinary control by the 
Commission as its body. The Commission is also amenable for its body against and before the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. 
 
Following institution is the Supervisory Committee, as we have already mentioned above in 
our previous statement, while the Director General gives any kind of result and information. 
The Committee is also informed when a case leads to a national judicial authority and also 
when the body or the institution inflicted denies and refuses to formulate with the 
recommendations imposed by the OLAF. 
 
The European Parliament is next in the list, where the Commission has to provide an annual 
report to the Council, the Parliament and the European Court of Auditors providing results 
and measures taken. More significantly, the Parliament Budgetary Control Committee 
(COCOBU) is responsible for the supervision of OLAF where the Director with oral reports 
on closed sessions informs this control Committee.  
 
The next European institution which OLAF is accountable is the European Court of Justice 
where the legality of the actions and measures taken is checked. The pertinent organ of ECJ 
which is pertinent for this kind of issues is the Court of First Instance. In a trial the 
Commission’s lawyers defend OLAF while in the most cases it is known that the Court of 
First Instance is unwilling to investigate a supposedly issue if the investigation is not 
completed. 
 
The Court of Auditors also checks OLAF through the annual report that ECA has to present 
and also through the Statement of Assurance which regulates the legality and regularity of 
European financial transactions. As for the historical reference the establishment of OLAF 
became after a special report of ECA that showed the urgency of immediate measures to be 
taken against fraud and corruption in the EU. We could also figure out the resume of OLAF to 
the ECA after its recommendations to OLAF’s peculiar “hybrid” status of investigative 
autonomy, its weaknesses in the legal framework, in the scant training of its staff and finally 
into its weak cooperation with Member State’s authorities (31). The cooperation between these 
two institutions is frequent due to the audit nature of these two bodies which are of vital 
significance for the EU.  
 
The last institution that OLAF has liability to is the European Ombudsman. It is true that the 
latter treats OLAF as an independent body of European Commission. There is an explanation 
behind this decision and that is because many times european civilians and european parties 
have complained about occasions of mismanagement. 
 
 
31) “Financial Management and Fraud in the European Union”, European Union Committee,    
Volume I, House of Lords, London, 2006 
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8.4.2   Liability to institutions and individuals been audited 
 
There have been frequent complaints about infringement the rights of individuals been 
audited. The addressee was usually the European Ombudsman, the Supervisory Committee 
and the Court of First Instance (CFI). Whenever there is a possibility of an investigating a 
higher official or an institution then OLAF is obliged to inform them. It is necessary to have 
the right content of justification in order to proceed into an audit. The documents have to 
include the identity of the person which is under investigation, secondly a summary of the 
audit along with any kind of information which is useful in order to take administrative 
measures for the protection of European interests. However, there had to be a lot of effort in 
order to create a more structured information flow between OLAF and Commission. In fact 
one report in 2003 managed for the establishment of a Memorandum leading to a limited flow 
of information for internal investigations. 
 
Different opinions have expressed from higher european officials as for the necessity of 
OLAF to disclosure any information before or during the investigation from the Commission 
because if they do not follow so they could have concealed the investigation procedure being 
conducted, something that is quite opposite to the individual’s dignity. 
 
On the other side, the Commission has every right to know if there exists any kind of 
irregularity regarding the vast section of european finance. For this reason, it is necessary for 
specific articles regarding the conduct of OLAF in these issues, to be amended. The Director-
General should have the appropriate and the adequate margins to behave in the way he 
believes (when, to whom and how much information) that it would be better both for his 
institution. Furthermore, for the subordinate side of the audited institution or individual it 
should also be on obligation on the recipient to confine to information received, not to 
distribute it keeping thus its confidentiality.  
 
 
 
8.5   Powers and functions of investigation and inspection process 
 
8.5.1   Internal and external investigations 
 
One of the most crucial points that have to be emphasized is that OLAF might conduct 
numerous investigations under the shield of independence whilst its subsumption to the 
European Commission as an administrative part of it. (32)  One more important fact is that the 
audit of OLAF is not restricted into the boundaries of a european institution but also in the 
spectrum of economic operators in the member states. 
 
There are two kinds of investigations: the internal and the external. The internal investigative 
function involves inquires to all Community’s institutions and bodies including also and the 
Committee of the Regions. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has cancelled a 
recently proposal of European Central Bank and from European Investment Bank for the 
maintenance of competences over investigations regarding their respective internal cases. 
 
 
 
32) Giovanni Kessler, Former Director-General of OLAF 2011-2017, “ European Anti-Fraud Office, a 
brief overview’’, A statement of a former Director-General of OLAF 
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As for the external investigations, these are inquires in all of the Member-States, according to 
the Regulation 2185/96 (33), where OLAF could conduct an inquiry on individuals businesses’ 
records and ask for explanations. Then the Commission informs the competent authorities of 
Member-State. Due to the absence of authoritative power of OLAF against individuals and 
businesses the Council Regulation itself obligates the Member-State to take actions by 
providing the appropriate assistance to help the auditors accomplish their investigation. 
 
 
 
8.5.2   Phases of OLAF’s investigative process 
 
The investigative process of the body has three phases: the selection phase, the investigation 
phase and lastly the monitoring phase. 
 
Figure 7: OLAF’s investigative process 
 
 
Source:”European Anti-Fraud Office, a brief overview” 
 
 
33) The Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96”, A 
regulation concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to 
protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities, The 
Brussels, 11 November, 1996 
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During the selection phase, when a complaint is received by OLAF institution the 
Investigation Selection and Review Unit examines it and provides its opinion. Then it is 
Director’s General decision if he would dismiss it or forward it into the investigation phase. 
 
When the case reaches into the investigation phase then a whole mechanism, including the 
contribution of Member-States, is mobilized. The Director-General then makes any 
recommendation that is deemed necessary. 
 
Moving into the last phase, the phase of monitoring, different recommendations could be 
arisen (disciplinary, financial, judicial and administrative) along with the monitoring of their 
implementation or following the other way of no recommendations at all. 
 
It is worth notable that the period of 2010-17 OLAF has conducted over 1800 investigations 
and made over 2300 recommendations concerning judicial, financial, disciplinary and 
administrative action to be taken by the competent authorities of the Member States and the 
EU. 
 
As a result, large amount of unduly spent has returned to EU budget showing that the better 
anti-fraud safeguards were established through Europe. 
 
  
Figure 8 : OLAF’s investigative activity in 2017 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, OLAF 
 
 
Lastly, OLAF’s budget for 2016 was 57,7 million € while at the same time in the budget for 
2017 there was a small increase to 60 million €. 
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8.6   Cooperation between ECA and OLAF  
 
The cooperation between these two bodies is frequent and very useful for the financial 
stability and integrity of EU’s finances. The two higher officials of the two institutions 
(President and Director-General) shall handle each situation with high responsibility 
according to a decision regarding their conduct. However, there were many obstacles to be 
overtaken regarding the investigation policy of OLAF, the management of priorities and the 
procedures for collaboration within the authorities of the member state. (34) 
 
More specifically, when an investigation of a suspected fraud is about to begin then the 
President should provide the Director-General with specific details and require from him to 
inform the ECA if OLAF will open any investigation or not and if so what subsequent change 
will made.(35)  
 
One more aspect of this recent decision is the possible disclosure of informant’s identity. If an 
informant would like to keep his anonymity then the ECA should inform OLAF to do so and 
if the latter insist to disclosure his name then the ECA should provide that information if the 
informant consent to.  
 
Also, ECA during an audit shall not inform other EU’s institution or body that has forward 
the information to OLAF unless specific circumstances require so. On the other hand ECA 
could inform the auditee about his financial irregularity concerning a fraud activity. 
 
Furthermore, when OLAF requires additional information about an individual case then the 
President should forward it through the contact persons who are responsible for this job. 
 
As concerns previous cases of fraudulent activity, the President should request from OLAF an 
annual report regarding the open cases and of cases closed during the year and then to prepare 
an annual  report including OLAF’s contribution and information. 
 
During an open investigation ECA will continue to conduct an audit with the related audit 
task unless this risks OLAF’s investigation activity where in that case the President will 
demand more information about a possible problem during his involvement. 
 
Lastly, the President is accompanied and assisted by his Legal Service which coordinates the 
whole procedure at operational level along with OLAF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34) Lars F Tobisson, “The European Court of Auditor’s special report on the management of OLAF”, 
A report of an ECA member , Brussels, 12-13 July, 2005 
 
35) European Court of Auditors, “ Decision No 43-2017 on cooperation between the European Court 
of Auditors (ECA) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) concerning cases of suspected fraud 
identified by the ECA during its audit work or provided to it as unsolicited denunciations from third 
parties”, Luxembourg, 14 September, 2017 
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9   The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 
 
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office is a decentralized and independent prosecution 
office whose main competences are the combating of fraud in EU.  
 
 
9.1   Institutional position, legal basis and establishment of EPPO 
 
It was April 2017 when 16 Member-States agreed to collaborate more closely regarding the 
fraud in the EU. Based on a mandate from the Treaty of Lisbon the European Commission 
proposed the establishment of an office like this. This effort mobilized six more Member-
States reaching the number of 22 participators where in November 2017 the EU adopted the 
Regulation 2017/1939 establishing the EPPO.  
 
Its legal basis lies on the article 86 of the “Treaty on the functioning of the European Union” 
of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Member-States which are not participants in the EPPO 
are Hungary, Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
The exact location of EPPO’s premises is in Luxembourg. 
 
 
 
 
9.2   Role, administrative and operational organization of EPPO 
 
9.2.1   Role and competences of EPPO 
 
The ability of european institutions to combat any fraudulent activity across EU’s borders is 
limited. The new established office of EPPO could act independently without taking in mind 
any lengthy national judicial operation. Its operations are fully independent from any EU 
institution or national authorities of Member-States. So, its prosecutors are authorized to 
conduct an audit in Member-States. 
 
The scope of its actions might differ and it could be any accounting or tax analysis. The use of 
smooth channels of communication could facilitate the cooperation between Member-States 
and EPPO while the latter might adopt a single prosecution policy across the EU abolishing 
that way the current prosecution approach. 
 
EPPO investigates, prosecutes and brings to justice any crime concerning fraud on EU budget 
or cross-border VAT fraud above 10 million €. (36)  It is true that a big amount of european 
VAT frauds is lost due to transnational fraud. The incapacity of EU’s bodies like OLAF and 
Eurojust to make any criminal prosecution in Member-States led to the establishment of 
EPPO which has the authority to overcome such deficiencies by conducting any investigation 
affecting EU’s finances. 
 
 
 
 
36) “Frequently Asked Questions on the European Public Prosecutor's Office”, European Commission 
- Fact Sheet, Brussels, 1 August 2018 
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9.2.2   Structure of EPPO 
 
The EPPO is built on two levels: the central and the national. However, it is true that the first 
level supervises the operations of the second level. The first level consists of the European 
Chief Prosecutor who is responsible for the management of the office and for the organization 
of its work. Then, there is a college of prosecutors responsible for decisions concerning 
strategic issues. This college is consisted of 22 European prosecutors (one for each participant 
Member-States) two of whom work as Deputies for the European Chief Prosecutor, the 
Administrative Director along with a group of investigative staff. 
 
Figure 9 : EPPO Structure 
 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
The second level which is the decentralised or national level consists of European delegated 
prosecutors who are located in each participant Member-State and have the competences of 
prosecuting and making criminal investigations. Apart from the delegated prosecutors there is 
also a body of permanent chambers which supervises the investigations and the audits while it 
proposes and takes operational decisions. 
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9.3   Aspects of EPPO independence 
 
There are several aspects emphasizing the independence of EPPO. Firstly, according to its 
Regulation EPPO should not be influenced or take instructions for favour of any Member-
State acting this way like an impartial body. 
 
Another reason strengthening the independence is that the location of EPPO would be totally 
different from other EU’s institution or organization premises. 
 
Thirdly, one significant aspect is that the appointment of European Chief Prosecutor is taken 
after a decision of European Parliament and the Council. The time period as the highest 
official of EPPO is seven years deemed that way as an adequate duration to implement his 
policies and not seek for re-election. His dismissal could only become by an ECJ’s decision. 
 
Finally, one last aspect concerns the European Delegated Prosecutors as the Regulation 
demands the national prosecutors to be completely independent from the national prosecution 
authorities.  
 
 
 
9.4   Accountability of EPPO  
 
Just as every european institution has the right to make accusations against certain individuals 
or companies, thus the defendants should have the right to protect and defend themselves. 
This aspect is ensured by the Regulation which includes a set of procedural safeguards. Those 
safeguards protect the defendants according to the existing EU regulation and to the national 
defence rights. 
 
Some of the rights which are granted by the EU regulation and from the Charter of 
Fundamental rights of the EU could be presented below. Those are at first the interpretation 
and the translation regarding the case been prosecuted for. Next, the access to the information 
materials and additionally the access to a lawyer whereas in a case of detention the ability to 
communicate with third persons and to appoint experts to handle any decision. Lastly, the 
right to remain silent using also the defend right of his national law which governs the whole 
procedure.  
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CHAPTER IV 
The Greek Court of Audit as an audit body 
 
Introduction 
The Greek Court of Audit or Chamber of Accounts has double nature and that is as an 
administrative organ (along with the other two bodies of Greek Public Administration) and as 
a Supreme Administrative Court with specific jurisdiction. 
 
 
1    Historical background of Greek Court of Audit 
Going back into the ancient years there were evidences and types of sound financial control 
both in the ancient Greece but also in the period before and during the Greek revolution of 
1821.  
A brief analysis of the first case during the ancient Greece is that in Athens the king along 
with an independent body of public auditors was conducting in a tactical base an analysis and 
a control of state’s public finances. That kind of audit deemed to be the ultimate type of audit 
in the ancient Greek years and set to be the cornerstone of the contemporary type of Greek 
Court of Audit.  
During the period of the Greek revolution the cause that made an urgent the establishment of 
an audit institution is the appearance of types of financial fraud while the Greek state that 
period was at the edge of an economic disaster. Efforts were made with the establishment of 
temporary Committees and bodies in order to handle the disastrous consequences and results 
of the Greek economy. It was obvious that way the need for an independent audit body for the 
rationalization of Greek finances. 
The Greek authorities of that period tried to create an audit body according to the European 
standards. They did not however try to formulate and integrate a body according to the needs 
of the already Greek financial situation but they proceeded to the formulation of a body 
according to the European standards and more specifically according to the French 
authorities. This kind of rush could have been detrimental to the Greek political authorities 
because the decision taken for French standards could not be adjusted into the already 
administrative type of Greek authorities. 
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The idea of the creation of the Greek Court of Audit as we know it now, became in 1833 after 
a recommendation of a French person named Jean-Francois Artemond Regny (37) who 
contributed also in its organization. So, the name of the Greek body was taken by the French 
word “Cour de comptes” which has been set up by the Napoleon in 1807 and after the Decree 
“27 September- 9 October of 1833” which is comprised by 63 articles regarding the 
organization and the operation of the new body. (38)  
Worth notable among all the other constitutional revisions is the revision of 2001 when it was 
clarified clearly in the Greek Court of Audit the discrimination of its three competences and 
tasks. More specifically, the clarification of discrimination into audit competences, into 
advisory competences and into jurisdictional competences. 
The location of the Greek’s Court of Audit premise is in Athens. 
 
 
2   The institutional position of Greek Court of Audit and its legal basis 
 
During the past years there was a confrontation between Greeks authorities if the Greek Court 
of Audit should have administrative and judicial jurisdiction. The founder of the Greek body, 
Artemond Regny, has tried to emphasize the legal capacity of the body by defining its double 
nature as an auditor of financial accounts and as a council with the competence of financial 
accounts management.  
 
Lately, in 1975 it was mentioned that the administrative nature of the body was above its 
judicial because the latter was a continuation of the administrative competence of Greek Court 
of Audit. (39) 
 
After 1975 the body obtained purely judicial nature while we could say that the dispute of its 
judicial nature came after opposing non judicial competences through the years. The highest 
judicial and administrative authorities were in controversy over the body’s nature. More 
specifically, the Supreme Court of Greece supports Audit’s double nature while the Council 
of State accepts the opinion of the purely judicial body.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37) E. Asanaki, “Artemond Regny, The French economist and his contribution to Greece, 1831-1841”,  
Athens, Greece, 1989 
38) A.G. Dimitropoulos, “ Organization and operation of the State, traditions of constitutional law”, 
Athens, 2001 
39) Milionis Nikolaos, “The institutional role of the Greek Court of Audit”, Athens, 2002 
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3   Administrative and operational organization of Greek Court of Audit 
 
The operation and the function of the body is regulated by the General Commissioner of the 
State. The body exerts its competences into a wide range of higher sections while at the same 
time they are published in the Government’s Gazette.(40) 
 
3.1   Structure of the Greek Court of Audit 
 
The Greek Court of Audit consists of the President ( Ms. Theotokatou Androniki), six vice 
Presidents, twenty advisors-consultants, forty  reeves and forty rapporteurs.  
 
The President supervises the operation and the employees into the body, the meeting along 
with the conferences and makes any suggestion he deems that is the appropriate one. The 
vice-presidents direct the operation of the sections where they preside but they can also 
exercise advisory tasks and duties. The President is furthermore substituted and replaced by 
the senior vice president, while the vice president is replaced either by other vice president or 
from a senior consultant. Finally, the consultants into the judicial and advisory formations 
they recommend the cases been nominated for. 
 
Reeves are appointed the rapporteurs of the Audit Court with at least seven years of services 
into the body and their tasks differentiate. One of them is the participation in conferences with 
advisor opinion and vote. 
 
Also, the reeves might appoint the consultants and the official appointment as long as and the 
promotion which is decided by the Ministry of Justice. 
 
Additionally, there is one more authority into the Audit Court which is the General 
Supervision of State and is comprised from the General Commissioner of the State, the 
Commissioner of the State and three vice Commissioners of the State. 
 
The Commissioner General is the President and he is appointed by a decree while the vice 
Commissioner is appointed by the Ministry of Justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40) Raikos.A., “Constitutional law, introduction-organization”, Vol. II , Athens-Komotini, 1991 
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3.2   Role and scope of Greek’s Audit Court 
 
As laid down from article 98 of the Greek constitutional law the competences of the body 
could be presented as follows: 
 
1) The audit of State’s expenditures as well as the supervision of local authorities and self-
governments 
2) The audit of covenants which are of high financial value where the public sector is 
involved 
3) The audit of individuals, local self-governments or other legal person  
4) The consultation for drafts concerning pensions or service recognition according to 
paragraph 2 of article 73 
5) The composition and submission of a draft towards the Greek Parliament for the balance 
sheet of the State 
6) The judgment of individuals regarding pension allocation 
7) The judgment of cases regarding civil servants for every fraud or data concealment 
 
 
As follows from above, the competences of the body are divided into three categories: the 
jurisdictional, the audit and the advisory competences 
 
Jurisdictional competences are those dealing with account audits, the pension distribution and 
the liability of civil servants.  
Audit competences are those dealing with the preventing control of public expenditures, the 
high financial value contracts and the repressive control of civil servants’ account. 
Advisory competences are those dealing with the official statement of Audit Court regarding 
the balance sheet of the State. 
 
 
 
 
4   Preventive control of public expenditures 
 
 
In Greece the State’s budget is in the competences of the executive authority but the decision 
of the accomplishment is taken by the Ministers. During a decision there are various stages in 
order to be implemented and these stages are examined thoroughly for their expenditures by 
the Audit Court. 
 
The content of audit competences of preventive control contains: 
1) The submission of a draft to the Parliament regarding the balance sheet 
2) The audit of State’s and local self-government’s expenditures 
3) The supervision of any individual who manages and administers public funds 
4) The monitoring of public revenues 
5) The examination of contracts’ legality 
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The audit of Ministries’ expenditures is conducted by the reeves while the audit of smaller 
authorities like local self-governments is conducted by the Commissioners of the Audit Court. 
This audit concerns the regularity of public expenditures and not their feasibility which each 
Minister is responsible for. 
 
The procedure of preventive control is regulated by the Audit Court while a Commissioner 
could cancel or forward the decision of public expenditure. The Commissioner could also 
examine if the expenditure is legal and accompanied by the correct documents. 
 
Furthermore, preventive control could also be conducted from other organs of the body which 
examine the legality of administrative actions according to article 17 paragraph 3 from 
Audit’s Court organism. 
 
The audit of high financials’ value contracts is solely conducted by the Audit Court according 
to the revised article 98. With this regulation it is constitutionally fortified the already 
competence of the body to examine public sector’s contracts which are exceeded a specific 
financial value limit. 
 
The results of preventive control which is conducted before the disbursement of public funds 
might be either the protection of public administration’s financial interests, either the security 
of transactions among creditors, suppliers and public sector either finally the protection of 
public amenable individuals against the Audit Court. (41) 
 
 
 
 
5   Repressive control of public expenditures 
 
According to article 98 paragraph 1 of Greek Constitution in the competences of Audit Court 
is included the account audit of public amenable individuals. The main difference between 
repressive and preventive control is that the first one is conducted after the completion of a 
short time management while the second one is conducted before the completion of the 
financial transaction.  
 
Public amenable individuals are not only those who manage public property but also those 
who without any legitimate authorization manage property and funds so they are called de 
facto amenable persons. 
 
The account is prepared by the amenable persons and should be accompanied by the 
legitimate documents so that the Audit Court could examine them. 
 
Depending on the direct or indirect submission of documents to the Audit Court the amenable 
individuals are categorized into main and subordinate persons.  
 
 
 
 
 
41) Milionis Nikolaos, “The Greek Audit Court, Modern Trends and development”, Nomiki 
Viliothiki, Athens, 2012 
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As main amenable persons are the individuals of public administration services who have the 
liability to the Audit Court for the submission of accounts while subordinate persons are those 
who are accountable to main persons and their exemption is related with the exemption of 
main subordinate persons. 
 
The repressive control is exercised by the echelon of the audit Court and the account 
examination is conducted by services of the body against legal persons of local self-
governments and local communities. 
 
The examination starts with the submission of the appropriate justifications to the Audit 
Court. During the audit it is examined the regularity and the legality of management and the 
accuracy of the accounts. 
 
After the examination the echelon proceeds in the exemption of amenable persons and if there 
occur doubts then the Court proposes a draft of alterations and deficiencies. 
 
The deficit is charged to the amenable persons with an imputation which means a judicial or 
an administrative act. The Court could impose sanctions in a case of omission even in a case 
of limited negligence and on the other side the amenable person should provide that the 
negligence was not in his culpability.  
 
 
 
 
 
6   Examination of high financial value contracts 
 
6.1   General information  
 
According to article 98 paragraph 1 of the revised constitution it is fortified the competence of 
the Audit Court to examine any contract of high financial value. This audit is conducted 
during the frame of preventive control before the sign of the contract. For this reason if a pre-
signed contract would be sent into the Court, the latter might abstain of the audit.  
 
More specifically, it could be asked from the pertinent Minister to be examined for all 
contracts which exceed a certain big amount. The examination of this kind of contracts has 
been fortified constitutionally after the State’s effort to co-respond into time period 
requirements where the fraud in public’s sector framework is a usual phenomenon.  
 
The audit of each public contract is regulated both in a preventive way and in a repressive 
way. Specific echelons from the Court are established in order to decide which of the public 
contracts could be detrimental for the public prosperity and which not.  
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6.2   The audit technique 
 
The Audit’s echelons have developed a technique which signifies that the Audit is responsible 
for the examination of contracts’ legality procedure without checking the soundness of them. 
Additionally, the Court, according to the echelons, investigates as a judicial organ whether the 
public administration implements sound techniques regarding the public administration’s 
contracts.  
 
Moreover, only in a case of misdemeanor in the management of public’s funds could lead to a 
negative opinion from the echelons. Misdemeanors of less importance are deemed the law’s 
violations regarding the internal organization and function of the administration without 
having any impact on third parties. 
 
More specifically, it is checked the competence of the organs that took the decision, the 
procedure that was selected, the declaration selected and the publicity of the contest. Also, if 
there were excluded with purpose specific companies and individuals from the contest. The 
echelon decides also if the contest committee’s decision was right. 
 
Lastly, the echelon distinguishes its decisions between the self-appointed and the non self-
appointed where the last one is guided by the administration of the Court and the first is not 
regulated by the Court and concerns the declaration and the procedure of the contest. (42) 
 
 
 
 
 
7   Relationship between Greek Court of Audit and ECA 
 
One big and significant aspect of ECA is its cooperation with national audit courts of EU’s. 
According to a specific article of the Treaty of EU the ECA is in close cooperation with 
national audit authorities. 
 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam punctuates that all european audit courts are equal 
along with trust spirit retaining at the same time their independence. The promotion of this 
cooperation is preserved by one Contact Committee of Courts’ presidents which makes an 
annual meeting discussing about relevant issues and analyzing various results of their 
inquiries. 
 
The cooperation between the European and the Greek authorities ought to be according to 
international audit standards where nowadays the relationship between ECA and Greek 
authorities is something more than a practical necessity which is illustrated with closer 
collaboration between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42) Sarmas loannis, “State and Justice, public money under control”, Athens-Komotini, 2003 
65 
More specifically, the Greek Court applies the European Law and acknowledges at the same 
time the primacy and the supralegality versus the internal law. 
 
The relationship between two institutions is based into the following principles: 
 
1) The principle of independence and equality. It is true that the two bodies are self-contained, 
independent and equivalent organs of the legal order which has different mission and are 
governed by different legal status quo. Nevertheless, in the European Community Law there 
are significant exceptions regarding the law above like the adoption of rules of law which 
have direct application. 
 
2) The principle of Community’s Law superiority against the national one. The superiority of 
community against national law prevails and renders the latter one as a non-applicable. 
 
3) The principle which is imposed by the Community allegiance. More specifically, the 
Member-States and national authorities take every specific or general standard which is 
appropriate in order to fulfill any liability from the Treaty or result from Community’s organs. 
Also, the Member-States facilitate the Community in its mission accomplishment and abstain 
from every measure which might risk the accomplishment of Treaty’s interests. 
 
4) The principle of subsidiarity. In the degree regarding different sectors of the exclusive 
competence of the Community this principle could not be implemented. However, in the case 
of Community’s and Member-States competence, this principle has full application. 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
 
I. Remarks by the ECA concerning the EU Anti-Fraud Programme 
 
As we know the EU Anti-Fraud Programme has as its main objective the prevention and the 
fight against fraud. The Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFFs) of the previous years, 
includes the programs “Hercule I,II,III”. Apart from the Hercule program which was 
implemented in order to tackle fraudulent activities in the EU, two other key systems were 
financed. The first is Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS) regarding the activities of the 
European Commission and the second is the Irregularity Management System (IMS) which 
advises the EU Member-States regarding their obligation to report any fraud concerning 
EU’s funds.(43) 
 
The EU Anti-Fraud Programme has as its main objective to tackle and prevent EU’s fraud 
and corruption and to provide tools for information exchange and support for any 
operational activity in the fields of customs and agricultural matters. 
 
However, there is a continued criticism of ECA against this Programme because as it was 
observed while the initial efforts from the Commission were towards the right direction 
many overlaps between the programs occurred. 
 
Also there is a lack into specific rules for the accession of the eligibility of actions that are 
financed. One more issue that seems to remain vague is the amount of Member –States 
contribution through their national budgets for the co-financing rate which is the actual 
percentage of EU contribution to the cost of the actions. (44) 
 
Recommendations 
Bearing in mind the majority of ECA’s remarks for the EU Anti-Fraud Programme the ECA 
proposes to continue the current Hercule program and the finance of AFIS and IMS only by 
combining actions in similar areas leading to the efficient and effective use of resources. 
Regarding the program’s objective and indicators there should be better specification in 
order to evaluate and monitor the implementation of the results because in the current 
situation the indicators, which are not relevant and credible, do not measure the results and 
the impact of actions taken to support the protection of EU’s financial interests. 
Furthermore, measures for the clarification of the frequency of performance reporting, the 
regulation of a maximum co-financing rate and the evaluation by an independent evaluator. 
Lastly, there is a recommendation by the ECA to the Commission in order to curry out the 
assessment to explore the program’s overlaps and synergies with other EU actions. 
 
 
43) Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the 
administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the 
Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters 
44) “Official Journal of the European Union”, Information and Notices, Volume 62, 10 January 2019 
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II. Remarks by the ECA concerning the cooperation between OLAF and 
EPPO 
 
As we know due to the future participation of EPPO in the financial audit of EU’s resources 
and funds the ECA proposed few alterations regarding its cooperation with OLAF. The ability 
of EPPO to investigate and prosecute crimes across the Members-States’ borders may change 
the current legal and institutional fraud procedure. 
 
However, numerous proposals have been made regarding the effectiveness of OLAF’s 
investigations, like for example the access of OLAF to bank accounts and the clarification as 
to whether the national or European law is applied in an OLAF’s investigation.  
 
The current investigative OLAF’s framework should change and the Commission shall make 
two amendments into the medium and short term where in the first the Commission may 
propose further legislative actions while in the second it should address the overall issue of 
OLAF’s effectiveness. 
 
We all know that the legal framework along with the core features of OLAF has not been 
modified during the past few years. Although, progress was made due to the alterations of 
2017 regarding the violations of EU funds through VAT’s irregularities and additionally the 
Council’s decision to charge the EPPO with investigative and prosecuting powers concerning 
any criminal financial irregularity. 
 
OLAF’s activities spread through the area where EPPO has no responsibility and competence 
like for example when EPPO decides not to investigate or in Member-States which are not 
EPPO’s participants.  
 
However, there is no time for the Commission for an action-plan with specific deadlines 
neither for the specification of the exact issues which would be addressed by OLAF. For this 
reason, OLAF would remain an administrative body with the power of sanctions against the 
financial irregularities. The procedural guarantees, which help OLAF in its investigations 
since 2013, remain insufficient because EU Courts no actions for the annulment are permitted 
against OLAF’s investigative acts including, of course, its final reports. Also the proposal for 
a Controller of procedural guarantees is only provide for a non-binding control of OLAF’s 
activities and additionally those activities should be submitted to a review of the Court of 
Justice of the EU in order to ensure the procedural safeguards that have been applied. 
 
Aspects of cooperation between OLAF AND EPPO 
 
Four principles govern the cooperation between OLAF and EPPO and those principles are: 
close collaboration, exchange of information, non duplication of work and complementarity. 
Also OLAF and Member-states should inform EPPO about any information which falls into 
its competence. Various offices and EU bodies could be benefited from OLAF’s 
investigations but this could also increase the time needed for information to reach the EPPO. 
So, any preliminary evaluation, which takes much time, may jeopardize the success of any 
action.  
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On the other side if the EPPO asks OLAF for any additional information, analysis and 
operational support then OLAF has to facilitate the procedure and contribute towards this 
effort. 
 
Furthermore, any evidence which is collected by OLAF on behalf of the EPPO should be 
admissible in national court in the same way as it was an EPPO’s evidence. On the opposite 
side, OLAF is not required to forward any evidence to EPPO unless this evidence interfered 
in the EPPO’s investigations.  
 
The duplication of OLAF’s and EPPO’s work is avoided but OLAF could conduct a new 
investigation if the adaptation of precautionary measures and disciplinary action is needed. 
Regarding the exchange of information in the proposal it is not referred when and whether the 
Commission and the OLAF should receive any information from EPPO in dismissed cases 
and in cases which lead into indictment. (45) 
 
 
 
Figure 10: OLAF’s activities affected by the establishment of the EPPO 
 
 
 
Source: Official Journal of the European Union, volume 62 
 
 
 
45) “Official Journal of the European Union”, Information and Notices, Volume 62, 1 February 2019 
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Recommendations 
 
Firstly, the Commission should specify the kind of information that the Commission and 
OLAF should take from EPPO in order to increase the tasks of developing EU policies 
against fraud and corruption. As we said before, the legislative bodies should ensure that 
OLAF should foreword to EPPO any information without delay. Also, there should be a 
specification of the status in national and European Courts of evidence collected by OLAF 
and an obligation for OLAF to forward all evidence to the bodies which are responsible. 
Furthermore, OLAF’s reports constitute acts that affect adversely the persons concerned and 
for this reason they are submitted to a review from Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Also, the clarification of OLAF’s role in any case that EPPO involves in a 
participating or non-participating Member-State and also taking into account any legal 
instrument for the judicial cooperation. Lastly, in the short term the role of OLAF should be 
modernised, turning this way into more strategic, thus becoming more effective. In the 
medium term, the cooperation between the two institutions should be evaluated followed by 
an analysis on whether EU bodies enhance the administrative and criminal investigations and 
lastly the need to consolidate all pertinent legal instruments in order to tackle fraud in a single 
regulatory framework. 
 
 
 
III. Remarks by the ECA concerning OLAF’s, Commission’s and EPPO’s 
contribution against fraudulent activities  
 
Despite the huge and long effort from the Commission to tackle fraud, ECA noticed that the 
Commission has not comprehensive information regarding the nature, the scale and the cause 
of fraudulent activity across the EU. This has led to a false evaluation of Commission’s Anti-
fraud Strategy’ (CAFS) risking its future strategic plans.  
 
OLAF along with its IT system which is for example the Irregularity Management System 
(IMS) where the Member-States could signify any fraudulent activity and taking into 
consideration its own resources, the Commission finally publishes its data. Nevertheless, 
according to ECA’s opinion, the Member-States’ authorities do not report all of the cases that 
are investigated by OLAF. More specifically, only three cases out of twenty were investigated 
and recorded by the IMS. (46 ) 
 
Intermediate public bodies during the implementation of EU programs may create small 
fraudulent activity and that is because EU, in order to reduce its administrative burden, 
obliges only the case that are above the amount of 10000 € to be reported by the Member-
States. Apart from the Commission’s guidelines regarding the identification and the report of 
a fraudulent activity from the Member-State this issue remains vague due to the different 
interpretation of a fraudulent activity from a Member-State. For this reason OLAF in 2015 
introduced two new indicators which are the fraud detection rate (FDR) and one more which 
was created for non-fraudulent activities. 
 
 
 
46) “Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed”, ECA’s Special Report, 2019 
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However, the indicators mentioned before illustrated that there are a lot of disparities in the 
level of irregularities and in the level of fraud detected by each Member-State. On the other 
side, the Commission stated that each Member-State’s national system is responsible for the 
fight against fraud but it is true that the Commission lacks of comprehensive checks of the 
quality of data reported in the IMS. Furthermore, national authorities have not different 
system of evaluation between irregularities affecting the national interests and irregularities 
affecting EU interests resulting in a further impediment of OLAF’s efforts to gather 
information on criminal cases regarding the EU’s financial interests. 
 
According to OLAF’s and Commission’s opinions the fraudsters are not always organised 
criminals but on the other side they are individuals who have benefited by EU funds and 
intentionally broke the law. The issue become more complicated when it comes to the 
discretion criteria where each Member-State has to distribute the EU fund equally.  
 
There is also a differentiation regarding Commission’s fraud proofing legislation where a 
specific unit was integrated in OLAF back in 2000 in order to ensure that spending schemes 
had specific legal provisions against fraud. During the years, efforts were made for the 
evaluation of measures taken while in December 2016 the Commission signed a contract with 
a consultancy company in order to evaluate the measures taken by Member-States to prevent 
and detect fraud from any european fund.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: OLAF’s judicial recommendations in 2009-2016 
 
 
 
Source: The OLAF Report 2016, p. 33 
 
 
 
As a result between the years 2014-2016 OLAF made more than 100 recommendations 
regarding the false fraud prevention by the Commission while only by the end of 2014 the 
Commission has included comprehensive Anti-Fraud provision in top level spending rules. 
Also, the contribution of OLAF in inter-service consultations was increased, where it was 
responsible for the proposed laws which evaluate the risk of fraud. 
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In the period 2014-16 OLAF contributed in 1716 of 2160 inter-service consultations resulting 
in a positive opinion of only 304 of them. Nevertheless, between 2009-2016 OLAF 
contributed to more than 541 judicial actions and recommendations where 308 of them was 
taken into consideration by the Member-States while only 137 led to indictments and 171 
cases were dismissed.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Main reasons for dismissal of OLAF’s investigative activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Analysis of Member States’ follow-up of OLAF’s judicial recommendations issued 
between January 2008 and December 2015; page 1 
 
 
 
 
Main reason for the dismissal of many cases was the insufficient number of old evidences that 
could lead to a prosecution, also some cases investigated by OLAF were not considered as a 
fraudulent activity under the national law and lastly the time limit for the initiation of a 
criminal procedure was passed in many occasions so the termination of the investigation was 
inevitable. 
 
The dismissal of OLAF’s investigations has shown the importance of close collaboration 
between OLAF and national authorities because according to ECA’s opinion many national 
prosecutors in the Member-States reported that they had no contact with OLAF before the 
finalization of each case and that they prefer to be informed much earlier. 
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Opinions on EPPO’s contribution 
 
In order for EPPO to supervise the operational work of the delegated prosecutors it will need 
adequate expertise in national criminal law along with its translation in many cases. This 
means respectively that EPPO will need further staff including national legal experts. 
 
One more aspect of EPPO’s supervision is that any investigation will be conducted by 
Member-State’s investigators under the supervision of EPPO meaning that national 
authorities will have the upper hand in every occasion. 
 
According to EPPO’s regulation the OLAF could pre-investigate and pre-evaluate cases that 
forwarded to EPPO so their close collaboration would contribute to a quick response on 
whether a criminal procedure should be initiated or other issues like when a case of 
investigation should be forwarded. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Firstly, the Commission should establish a new and robust fraud reporting system by 
enhancing the role of IMS so that the information for an investigation to be reported by all 
competent authorities. Also, the Commission has to increase the ability to collect any 
information from different sources by using different methods and to increase its antifraud 
strategy.  
 
Secondly, the Commission should ensure that its new antifraud strategy should have a 
comprehensive analysis of the targets as well as of the objectives and of measurable 
indicators. Furthermore, the Commission should perform a fraud risk assessment and ask 
from the Member-States to adopt a similar assessment before the implementation of any 
program.  
 
Lastly, the Commission should reconsider OLAF’s role along with its responsibilities 
regarding fraud because of the EPPO’s establishment. More specifically, the European 
Parliament and the European Council should be informed about OLAF’s strategic role against 
EU fraud. OLAF should lead the design and supervise any implementation of Commission’s 
policy and co-ordinate additionally anti-fraud activities in Member-States. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Fiscal policy is maybe the most crucial form of an economic regulation in every State’s 
finances and ever more in a Member-State of EU which has to adapt its economic policy 
according to european fiscal standards.  
 
For this reason the first chapter is referred into the Keynesian analysis dealing with the 
aggregate demand making a smooth introduction into the fiscal policy. The second chapter 
deepens its analysis into the current EU’s fiscal framework from where it results that the EU 
with specific Treaties has managed to regulate its fiscal imbalances across its Members 
through different fiscal and economic mechanisms. 
 
It is worth notable that in the next chapter there is an extensive analysis of european’s audit 
schemes that regulate the fiscal status and according to them, it is obvious that EU has 
managed to establish robust and effective bodies in order to protect its fiscal interests. 
 
Lastly, EU’s audit schemes have close collaboration with national audit courts of EU’s 
Member-States. One example is ECA’s and Greek’s Court cooperation from where we could 
deduce that the latter has more complex organizational structure and quite different scope and 
extent of competences than the first one.  
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